Beyond ConsequentialismConsequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms. |
Contents
1 Introduction | 1 |
A Troubling Normative Triad | 10 |
Too Demanding or Not Demanding at All? | 35 |
4 Harnessing Williams to Sharpen the Challenge to Consequentialism | 62 |
5 Deflating the Challenge of Consequentialism | 106 |
Alternative Conceptions of Impartiality | 139 |
7 Impartial Evaluation and Rational Authority | 177 |
8 Generalizing to Other Forms of Consequentialism | 226 |
264 | |
271 | |
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Common terms and phrases
3rd person account of practical agent—centered restrictions agent—neutral agent—relative reasons agent’s appeal argue arguments articulation authority of moral believer—neutral better and worse bring challenge to consequentialism Chapter conception of impartiality conflict consequentialist moral standards consequentialist theory course of action Darwall decisive moral reasons decisive reasons Derek Parfit evaluation of actions externalist first higher—order project higher—order reasons Hobbesian Ibid impartial evaluation impartial reasons impersonal conception impersonal considerations impersonal evaluation impersonal moral impersonal reasons impersonal standpoint independent moral significance interpersonal conception interpersonal reasons intuition Kantian lower—order projects moral evaluation moral requirements moral theory morally prohibited Nagel non—impersonal reasons normative ordinary moral plausible practical reason practical sphere presuppose property of actions RAMS rational agents rational authority rational requirement reason and deliberation reasons to act reasons to pursue recognition recognize reflected right action Scheffler’s Shelly Kagan significance standard act consequentialism Stephen Darwall sufficient reasons suggests theory of moral Thomas Nagel what’s best