Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public ChoiceWhen one thinks about how collective decisions are made, voting is the method that comes naturally to mind. But other methods such as random process and consensus are also used. This book explores just what a collective decision is, classifies the methods of making collective decisions, and identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Classification is the prelude to evaluation. What are the characteristics of a method of making collective decisions, the book asks, that permit us to describe a collective decision as good? The second part of the book is detailed exploration of voting: the dimensions in which voting situations differ, the origins and logic of majority rule, the frequency of cycles in voting, the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, criteria for ways of cutting through cycles and the application of these criteria to a variety of rules, voting over continuums, proportional representation, and voting rules that take account of intensities of preferences. Relatively unknown methods of voting give voting a much greater potential than is generally recognized. Collective Decisions and Voting is essential reading for everyone with an interest in voting theory and in how public choices might be made. |
Contents
A Taxonomy of Collective Decision Procedures | 21 |
Economic Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decisions | 27 |
General Criteria for Evaluating Collective Decision Procedures | 35 |
Copyright | |
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Other editions - View all
Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2006 |
Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice Nicolaus Tideman Limited preview - 2017 |
Common terms and phrases
87 elections achieve alternative vote approval voting Bucklin voting Chapter choice Clarke taxes collective decision procedures Condorcet consistency consensus continuum CPO-STV cycles demand-revealing process dimensions Dodgson rule dominant option eliminated evaluate Example Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem GOCHA set Gordon Tullock incentive income effects independence of clones individuals invariant loss consistency majority rule matrix of majorities maximin rule mode monotonicity mutual majority consistency Nicolaus Tideman number of candidates number of voters one-way streets paired comparisons pairs of options Pareto percentages of voters perfect-tie responsiveness person plurality positive responsiveness possible properties proportional representation proposal pseudo-consensus quota random process range voting ranked pairs rule RBVPR resistance to strategy rule lacks rule possesses Schulze method Schwartz consistency sequence of rankings Single Transferable Vote Smith consistency Smith set social welfare function status quo surplus Thompson insurance mechanism trade traffic lights two-ballot majority universal domain vote-processing rule voting rule weighted Condorcet rule winner