From Cognition to Being: Prolegomena for TeachersIn this book, McHenry challenges the still-regnant paradigm of knowledge acquisition as the end and means of schooling, supplanting it with an inquiry into what knowledge is. Tracing the development of the idea of knowledge from its roots in Descartes and Locke through the ontological turn in Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Buber, he provides an alternative rationale and vocabulary for a practice of schooling that engages teachers with students in being-together-and-inventing. Philosophically centered though accessibly written, with examples from the author's personal experiences with his own child and his students, the book engages the reader in inquiry rather than argument, leaving her not with a list of tips and prescriptions, but with a capacity for encounter with the actual persons in her classroom. Published in English. |
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already answer arena arises articulation assertion background Bakhtin being-together Being-with bring Buber centerboard child classroom clear and distinct cogito ergo sum cognitive colloquy commitment communication communion context conversation course culture Dasein Deborah Meier Descartes dialogue discourse Dustin dwelling encounter engaged epistemology experience facts give hear Heidegger says Heidegger's hermeneutic circle human Huston Smith I-You ideas individual intuition inventing John Locke kind knowledge language language-games Lawrence Cremin learning live Locke Locke's look Martin Buber Martin Heidegger means metaphor mind mutuality naming notice objects occurs ontology ourselves paradigm participants perception perhaps person Philosophical Investigations picture play possibility present question re-inventing reality realm relatedness relation representation responsibility Richard Rorty Saussure Saussure's Saussurean seems sense sharing shift skill social space speaking and listening speakinglistening structure talking teachers teaching things tion trans values vocabulary window Wittgenstein York
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Page 64 - Let us suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. 4
Page 64 - sensation": First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them... when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Page 68 - is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned... the dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding, being
Page 159 - Heaven-Haven I have desired to go Where springs not fail, To fields where flies no sharp and sided hail And a few lilies blow. And I have asked to be Where no storms come, Where the green swell is in the havens dumb, And out of the swing of the sea. The
Page 93 - How many kinds of sentence are there?", and answers: There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.
Page 68 - the dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding, being much-what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand..
Page 38 - nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to
Page 67 - Secondly, the other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got... which
Page 19 - there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language users master and then apply to cases.
Page 67 - and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.