Game Theory in the Social Sciences: A Reader-friendly GuideIndividuals, firms, governments and nations behave strategically, for good and bad. Over the last few decades, game theory has been constructed and progressively refined to become the major tool used by social scientists to understand, predict and regulate strategic interaction among agents who often have conflicting interests. In the surprisingly anodyne jargon of the theory, they ‘play games’. This book offers an introduction to the basic tools of game theory and an overview of a number of applications to real-world cases, covering the areas of economics, politics and international relations. Each chapter is accompanied by some suggestions about further reading. |
Contents
a bit of history | 1 |
2 What is a game? | 11 |
3 Solving a game
| 21 |
4 Understanding economics
| 47 |
5 Repeated games and collusive
behaviour
| 69 |
6 Understanding politics
| 85 |
7 Wargames
| 97 |
8 Trade security and hegemony
| 113 |
9 The role of information
| 129 |
10 Bargaining and cooperation
| 149 |
Notes | 165 |
173 | |
185 | |
Other editions - View all
Game Theory in the Social Sciences: A Reader-friendly Guide Luca Lambertini No preview available - 2011 |
Game Theory in the Social Sciences: A Reader-friendly Guide Luca Lambertini No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
adopted agent alternative amount auction bargaining becomes behaviour chapter choose coalition competition complete concept condition consequences consider consumer cooperative cost countries course definition dilemma dominant strategies economics entry equivalent example exists expected extensive fact Figure firms game theory given Hence idea illustrated incentive incumbent individual induction industry interest invest involved issue latter least located look Matrix measured monopoly moves Nash equilibrium nature network externality node non-cooperative Note observe outcome parties payoff perfect information play player political positive possible preferences prisoners probability problem profits pure strategies reason relevant remains REMARK repeated respectively result rules satellites selection shares social solution solve standard strictly dominant strategies subgame perfect subsidy suppose symmetric theorem trade voters weakly yields