Iraq Transition: Civil War Or Civil Society? : Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 20, 2004, Volume 1U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004 - Democratization |
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Common terms and phrases
administration al Anbar Ali al-Sistani allies Ambassador Arab world army attacks Baath Baathist Baghdad Basra believe BERGER billion Brahimi Bremer caretaker government Chairman civil civilian Coalition forces Coalition Provisional Authority COLE committee CPA's deal democracy democratic Dodge elections Embassy exile Fallujah going guerrillas hearings institutions insurgency Interim Governing Council internationalize Iraq Iraq's Iraqi Governing Council Iraqi National Congress Iraqi politics Iraqi population Iraqi public Iraqi society June 30 killed Lakhdar Brahimi leaders legacy of Saddam legitimacy liberation ment Middle East military militias months Muqtada al-Sadr Najaf number of troops occupation organized parties PERLE police poll President problems question regime role Saddam Hussein Sadrists security forces Senator BIDEN Senator BROWNBACK Senator CHAFEE Shia Shiite situation small number sovereignty stability strategy success Sunni Thank there's things tion transition trying United Nations violence weeks
Popular passages
Page 15 - Secretary of the Crusading Americans had said that "the explosion at Riyadh and Al-Khobar had taught him one lesson: that is not to withdraw when attacked by coward terrorists".
Page 11 - However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge, but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the "heart...
Page 14 - ... to ensure that the Iraqi Armed Forces are never again used to terrorize or oppress the people of Iraq. (B) Consistent with Iraq's status as a sovereign state, and with its desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003)...
Page 12 - We have not reached parity with them. We have the right to kill four million Americans—two million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons...
Page 15 - When tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu, you left the area in disappointment, humiliation, and defeat, carrying your dead with you.
Page 1 - Now is the time and Iraq is the place, in which the enemies of the civilized world are testing the will of the civilized world. We must not waver.
Page 20 - Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF...
Page 64 - February, are designed not only to discourage Iraqis from working for the new state but also to stop the growth of its institutions. They undermine attempts to deliver to the Iraqi population what they have been demanding since the fall of the Baath regime: law and order.
Page 62 - ... their presence, the small numbers of troops available for the commanders to deploy has plagued the US effort at reconstruction of postwar Iraq. Lack of an adequate number of soldiers has determined both the nature and quality of the law and order American troops have been able to enforce. In the run-up to war, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki in a senate hearing called for "hundreds of thousands" of troops to guarantee order.
Page 3 - Second, what status-of-forces agreement will make clear that the United States and Coalition Armed Forces will continue to provide internal and external security for the new Iraqi Government? Will that agreement make clear the chain of command and the relationship of Iraqi police, reserves, and army personnel with United States and Coalition forces? Third, will United Nations Security Council resolutions undergird the international legitimacy of the new Iraqi Government and all of the security arrangements...