Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and PoliticsUses a game theoretic approach to explore which economic policies are 'credible' and 'politically feasible', questions that had eluded traditional macroeconomic approaches. |
Other editions - View all
Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics Torsten Persson,Guido Enrico Tabellini Limited preview - 1990 |
Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics Torsten Persson,Guido Enrico Tabellini Limited preview - 2001 |
Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics Torsten Persson,Guido Enrico Tabellini No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
aggregate history Alesina candidates capital taxation central bank chooses commitment consumer cost credibility constraints credibility problems debt policy deviation discretion discuss elections employment equation equilibrium policy rule equilibrium refinements equilibrium tax policy escape clause ex ante ex post expected inflation first-order conditions fiscal policy future game theory government budget constraint government debt government’s Hence incentive constraints incomplete information incumbent indifference curve infinite horizon inflation rate inflationary institutions labor supply loss function marginal median voter ment Mimeo monetary policy Nash equilibrium nominal wage observed one-shot optimal optimal tax policy surprises policymaker pooling equilibrium preferences previous section previous subsection private agents private sector public debt public spending rational expectations reflects reputation revenue separating equilibrium sequential rationality signalling social contract subgame Subgame perfect equilibrium supply shock surprise inflation Tabellini tax rates theory tough type trigger strategies utility function variables wage setters wage strategy weak type zero inflation