Morality, Mortality: Volume I: Death and Whom to Save from ItWhy is death bad for us, even on the assumption that it involves the absence of experience? Is it worse for us than prenatal nonexistence? Kamm begins by considering these questions, critically examining some answers other philosophers have given. She explores in detail suggestions based on our greater concern over the loss of future versus past goods and those based on the insult to persons which death involves. In the second part, Kamm deals with the question, "Whom should we save from death if we cannot save everyone?" She considers whether and when the numbers of lives we can save matter in our choice, and whether the extra good we achieve if we save some lives rather than others should play a role in deciding whom to save. Issues such as fairness, solidarity, the role of random decision procedures, and the relation between subjective and objective points of view are discussed, with an eye to properly incorporating these into a nonconsequentialist ethical theory. In conclusion, the book examines specifically what differences between persons are relevant to the distribution of any scarce resource, discussing for example, the distribution (and acquisition) of bodily organs for transplantation. Kamm provides criticism of some current procedures for distribution and acquisition of a scarce resource and makes suggestions for alternatives. |
Contents
| 3 | |
| 11 | |
GENERAL ISSUES | 73 |
THEORETICAL ISSUES SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTS | 199 |
| 331 | |
| 335 | |
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Common terms and phrases
50 percent chance achievement additional adequate conscious aggregation argued argument asymmetrical attitude believe benefit better outcome candidate choose claim concern conflict consequentialist consider contestants counting numbers death is bad decide decision decline deontological deprive Derek Parfit differential outcome discussion distribution donate drug equal chance ex ante example expected utility extra utility fact factors fairness five future give greater number harm Ideal Procedure individual involves Jane's Joe and Jim Joe's killing lesser losses majority rule means morally Nagel needier neediest objective one's organ organ transplants override pain Parfit past point of view possible preference prenatal nonexistence proportional chances reason Ronald Dworkin save the greater significant single person Sob¹ Sob² Sob³ someone someone's subjective view substitution of equivalents suffer suggested Suppose survive SWIV Taurek Thomas Nagel toss a coin transplant treated unfairness urgency veil of ignorance versus weight worse worst wrong
Popular passages
Page 335 - Starzl et al., A Multifactorial System for Equitable Selection of Cadaver Kidney Recipients, 257 JAMA 3073-3075 (1987).