Philosophy after Objectivity: Making Sense in PerspectiveSince the beginning of philosophy, philosophers have sought objective knowledge: knowledge of things whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. This book uses lessons from debates over objective knowledge to characterize the kinds of reasons pertinent to philosophical and other theoretical views. It argues that we cannot meet skeptics' typical demands for nonquestion-begging support for claims to objective truth, and that therefore we should not regard our supporting reasons as resistant to skeptical challenges. One key lesson is that a constructive, explanatory approach to philosophy must change the subject from skeptic-resistant reasons to perspectival reasons arising from variable semantic commitments and instrumental, purpose-relative considerations. The book lays foundations for such a reorientation of philosophy, treating fundamental methodological issues in ontology, epistemology, the theory of meaning, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of practical rationality. It explains how certain perennial debates in philosophy rest not on genuine disagreement, but on conceptual diversity: talk about different matters. The book shows how acknowledgment of conceptual diversity can resolve a range of traditional disputes in philosophy. It also explains why philosophers need not anchor their discipline in the physicalism of the natural sciences. |
Contents
| 3 | |
Ontology Evidence and Philosophical Questions | 19 |
Justification MetaEpistemology and Meaning | 60 |
Meaning Interpretation and Analyticity | 106 |
Reasons Truth and Relativism | 152 |
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Common terms and phrases
action actually agnostic agnosticism analyticity answer appeal approach argument behavior Carnap causal chap chapter claim cogent cognitive coherence conceiving conceiving-independent concepts of truth conceptual commitments conceptual relativism consequentialists considerations constitutive standards construal dards Davidson definition depend determine entail epistemic justification epistemic standards epistemological essence evidential example existence explanatory project explanatory strategies indicating or expressing internalist justified belief knowledge language least linguistic logical meaningful moral Moser motivational set narrow content non-questionbegging epistemic reason non-questionbegging evidence normative reasons notion of justification notion of meaning notion of truth objects one's ontological operative notion perspectival philosophers physi physicalist principle principle of charity problem propositional knowledge psychological question questionbegging Quine Quine's rational realism regarding relative relevant reliable requires role semantic foundationalism semantic holism semantic project semantic standards sort specific notions standards for correct supervenience synonymy talk theorists theory things tion tokens true truth conditions typically understanding verificationism vocabulary well-foundedness