Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance

Peter A. Gourevitch, James Shinn

Princeton University Press, Jun 20, 2010 - Business & Economics - 368 pages

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases.


This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.

Contents

• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER ONE Introduction and Summary Argument: 1
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER TWO Governance Patterns What Causes What?: 15
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER THREE Framing Incentives The Economics and Law Tradition: 27
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER FOUR Politics Preferences and Institutions: 57
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER FIVE Preference Cleavages 1 Class Conflict: 95
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER SIX Preference Cleavages 2 Sectoral Conflict: 149
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER SEVEN Preference Cleavages 3 Transparency Voice and Pensions: 205
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance CHAPTER EIGHT Conclusion Going Forward: 277
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance DATA APPENDIX: 297
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance BIBLIOGRAPHY: 313
• The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance INDEX: 333

About the author

Peter A. Gourevitch is Professor of Political Science and founding Dean at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. He is the author of Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises and former coeditor of International Organization. James Shinn Visiting Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where he teaches courses on technology and foreign policy. Previously he worked in the U.S. State Department's East Asia Bureau and was later a general manager, entrepreneur, and outside director for fifteen years in the high tech industry at various firms including Dialogic, which he cofounded.

Bibliographic information

• Title: Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance
• Authors: Peter A. Gourevitch, James Shinn
• Edition: illustrated, reprint
• Publisher: Princeton University Press, 2010
• ISBN: 1400837014, 9781400837014
• Length: 368 pages
• Subjects: Business & Economics / Government & Business; Business & Economics / Industries / General; Political Science / Comparative Politics; Political Science / International Relations / General