Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1Ned Block In this introduction to the philosophical problems underlying the modern study of mind and behavior, Ned Block has collected the most important papers by the major figures in the field. He provides the only central reference work now available for scholars and students in this growing area of inquiry. Volume I covers general approaches to the study of the mind: behaviorism, reductionism, and functionalism. |
Contents
Introduction What Is Philosophy of Psychology? | 1 |
Behaviorism | 11 |
Brains and Behavior | 24 |
Selections from Science and Human Behavior | 37 |
A Review of B F Skinners Verbal Behavior | 48 |
What Physicalism | 67 |
Mental Events | 107 |
Special Sciences or The Disunity of Science as | 120 |
24 | 190 |
Functional Specification | 191 |
Armstrong on the Mind | 200 |
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications | 207 |
23 | 215 |
Mad Pain and Martian Pain | 216 |
37 | 223 |
Review of Putnam | 232 |
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Common terms and phrases
analysis analytical anomalous monism argue argument Armstrong behav behavior behaviorist brain C-fiber causal causal role causes characterization chological claim concept contingent correlate definition described disposition doctrine entail example experience explain fact Fodor FSIT func functional organization functionalist functionally defined H₂O havior Hilary Putnam homunculi-headed hypothesis iden identified identity theory inputs and outputs intuitions Journal of Philosophy kind Kripke Kripke's laws logical machine table Martian materialist meaning ment mental events mind mind-body problem n-tuple names nature neural notion object pain philosophy of mind physical events physicalist plausible possible world probabilistic automaton problem processes psycho Psychofunctional Psychofunctionalism psychological theory psychophysical Putnam qualitative character question realized reason reductionism relations rigid designator seems sense simulation sort specified spectrum inversion stimulus structure suppose T-terms thesis things tion tionalism tive true Turing machine type identity type physicalism version of functionalism