Reduction, Explanation, and RealismWhat is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, color, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? Though reduction has long been a favorite method of analysis in all areas of philosophy, in recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences. |
Contents
MODEST REDUCTIONS AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE | 19 |
IRREDUCIBILITY AND TELEOLOGY 15 | 45 |
REDUCTION AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY | 69 |
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL THEORY 46 | 97 |
WEAK EXTERNALISM AND PSYCHOLOGICAL | 133 |
PHYSICS BIOLOGY AND COMMONSENSE | 155 |
THE LIMITATIONS OF PLURALISM | 179 |
REDUCTION CAUSALITY AND NORMATIVITY | 225 |
SUPERVENIENCE COMPOSITION AND PHYSICALISM | 265 |
REDUCTION SUPERVENIENCE | 297 |
DESIRING OR BELIEVING? | 323 |
REDUCTIONISM AND FIRSTPERSON THINKING | 361 |
THE REDUCTIONIST VIEW | 381 |
THE AUTONOMY OF COLOUR | 421 |
Select Bibliography | 467 |
ELIMINATION VERSUS NONREDUCTIVE | 239 |
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Common terms and phrases
Anomalous Monism anti-reductionist appear argument Aristotelian Society ascriptions autonomous basic behaviour beliefs and desires biological causal explanation causal powers causally explanatory causes characterized claim cognitive colour common-sense psychology concepts connection constraints core-physical Davidson Dennett discourse levels distinct Donald Davidson effects eliminativism example explanatory interfacing externalist fission Fodor folk psychology functional explanation functionalist give given higher-level human I-thoughts identity indiscernibility individual intelligible intentional psychological intentional stance invoked kind laws levels of discourse light mechanisms mental properties metamerism moral natural selection non-reductive normative reason notion objects organisms person perspective Philosophy physical properties physicalist possible predicates principles problem propositional attitudes psychological explanation psychological properties question rational reduction reductionism reductionist referential components relativization relevant role S₁ sense social facts special sciences structural explanation supervenience suppose T₁ teleological theory things tion token Twin Earth types understanding variably realized yellow