Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game TheorySocial and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation. |
Contents
GAMES AND NETWORKS | 3 |
RESTRICTED COOPERATION IN GAMES | 21 |
INHERITANCE OF PROPERTIES IN COMMUNICATION | 53 |
VARIANTS ON THE BASIC MODEL | 89 |
NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES | 135 |
A NETWORKFORMATION MODEL IN EXTENSIVE FORM | 153 |
A NETWORKFORMATION MODEL IN STRATEGIC FORM | 173 |
NETWORK FORMATION WITH COSTS FOR ESTABLISHING | 193 |
Other editions - View all
Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory Marco Slikker,Anne van den Nouweland Limited preview - 2012 |
Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory Marco Slikker,Anne van den Nouweland No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
actions additional allocation rule allocation scheme anonymity associated assume average convex balanced called chapter characteristic function claim coalition-proof Nash equilibrium coalitional game communication situation complete network component efficiency conclude condition Consider consisting contains cooperation coordinate core costs cycle cycle-complete cycle-free defined denote described determine deviation directly easily equal establish example exists extensive fairness figure firm follows formation game N,v given Hence holds implies improve inheritance internally connected introduced least lemma Let N,v Myerson value N,vL network formation network N,L network-restricted game Note obtain parties path payoff payoff vector play player set position value possible potential game prefer proof prove receive relation represented restricted reward function S C N satisfies Shapley value similar stable strategy profile strong Nash structure subgame subgame-perfect Nash superadditive supported Suppose symmetric theorem tion underlying unique weighted
References to this book
Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions Gabrielle Demange,Myrna Wooders Limited preview - 2005 |
The Missing Links: Formation and Decay of Economic Networks James E. Rauch No preview available - 2007 |