The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies

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Harvard University Press, Jul 1, 2009 - Law - 344 pages

Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner’s principal asset—his home—will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government.

Fischel has coined the portmanteau word “homevoter” to crystallize the connection between homeownership and political involvement. The link neatly explains several vexing puzzles, such as why displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality and why local governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities. The Homevoter Hypothesis thereby makes a strong case for decentralization of the fiscal and regulatory functions of government.

 

Contents

An AssetMarket Approach to Local Government
3
Local Governments Corporate Form
21
Capitalization Zoning and the Tiebout Hypothesis
41
The Median Voter in Local Government Politics
74
Serrano and the California Tax Revolt
100
The Fruits of SchoolFinance Centralization
131
The Race to the Top in Environmental Protection
164
Beggar Thy Neighbor and Landfill Location
186
How Homevoters Remade Metropolitan Areas
209
Sprawl Metropolitanism and Local Control
231
Reforming and Reaffirming Local Government
262
Case References
293
General References
295
Index
325
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