Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa
This book offers a reconstruction of the early Stoic doctrine of prolepsis, revealing it to be much closer to Platonic recollection in certain respects than previously thought. The standard interpretation of prolepsis as preconceptions is inconsistent with their status as criteria of truth. Rather, prolepsis is a form of tacit knowledge that requires articulation and systematization. This reconstruction is supported by a comprehensive collection of texts relating to prolepsis from Epicurus to Alexander of Aphrodisias.
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Are Porlepses and Common Conceptions Identical?
Prolepsis and Common Conceptions as Criteria of Truth
Stages in the Development of Reason
Menos Paradox and the Early Stoa
The Formation of Prolepses
Prolepsis in Ordinary and Philosophical Cognition
Are the Stoics Empiricists or Rationalists?
The Usage of Πρόληψις Εννοια and Related Terms
The Early Stoa
Cicero and Seneca
Alexander of Aphrodisias
Epicurus and Later Epicureans
Alcinous animals apprehensive presentations argues argument Aristotle articulated assent auxco auxo aXXa belief Carneades categorical propositions ceptions Chrysippus Cicero claim cognitive Comm common conceptions common prolepses conceived concept-formation criteria of truth definition dialectic Diogenes Diss doctrine of prolepsis early Stoic enim Epictetus Epicurean Epicurus example exist experience false Frede gods grasp human interpretation ispl Kaxd knowledge lepses liev Math mental images Mixt natural conceptions npbq Obbink object oxav passage perception Philodemus philosophers Plac Platonic Plutarch prolepses and common proposition Ps-Plutarch's quae rational reason role Sandbach saxi saxiv Sedley sense sense-perception Sextus Empiricus similar sivai Socrates sophism soul Stoa Stobaeus Stoic doctrine suggests svvoia Syrianus tacit tacit knowledge theory things tion Todd virtue xcov xf|v xfjc xouxo xovq xr|v xrjv xrov xs Kal Zeno