Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2000 - Bank / Führungskräfte / Vergütungssystem / Leistungsorientierte Vergütung / Kreditgeschäft / Bankenaufsicht / Theorie - 38 pages
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abnormal returns agerial analysis announcement effects associated asymmetric information asymmetries bank monitoring CEPR Policy Paper choice of bank compensation package compensation scheme Discussion Paper expected cash flow expected utility extract private benefits Financial Economics financing choices financing decisions firm turns firm's stock price gross value Hence high profitability firms high profitability project implies incentive compatibility incentive compensation incentive contract incentive pay increases induce the manager informational asymmetries Journal of Financial low profitability firms low profitability project low type manager chooses manager to submit managerial compensation managerial effort market financing market-bank regime market-based compensation maximum non-pecuniary income mb regime minimum cost mode of financing moral hazard optimal contract positive market private information problem probability of success project type Proof of Proposition reaction to bank renegotiation rewards role of banks shareholder value Sheridan Titman stock market reaction submission to monitoring subscription tin project type 9 valuation effects