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abso absolute's absolutists abstract activity altho analogy appear believe Bergson Bradley called conceived concepts concrete conjunctive connexion consciousness contradictions definition dialectic distinct divine dualistic each-form empiricists ence everything exist external fact Fechner feel finite experience flux give Hegel hegelian higher human idealism idealists ideas identity inner intel intellectual intellectualist irrational irrationality Kant knower lecture living logic lute means ment mental metaphysical method monistic nature negation ness never Note notion objects once ourselves panpsychic pantheistic perfect rationality philosophy pluralism pluralistic point of view practical principle Professor psychology pure experience question radical empiricism rational rationalistic reality reason reductio ad absurdum relations religious rience Royce sciousness seems sensations sense separate sophism sort soul supposed T. H. Green theism theoretic things thinkers thought tion transcendental idealism transcendentalist treat true truth tychism unity universe verbal vision whole word
Page 372 - It seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for anything, it ought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience, to be able to avoid such tangles, or at least to simplify them somewhat. The pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no difference of truth that does n't make a difference of fact somewhere ; and it seeks to determine the meaning of all differences of opinion by making the discussion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or particular issue....
Page 355 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Page 125 - I believe that the only God worthy of the name must be finite, and I shall return to this point in a later lecture. If the absolute exist in addition — and the hypothesis must, in spite of its irrational features, still be left...
Page 210 - ... soul' does the compounding than you see into a man's living eighty years by 209 thinking of him as an octogenarian, or into our having five fingers by calling us pentadactyls. Souls have worn out both themselves and their welcome, that is the plain truth. Philosophy ought to get the manifolds of experience unified on principles less empty. Like the word 'cause...
Page 321 - Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it is many means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount.
Page 390 - Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention — this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure experiencephilosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed. Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.
Page 329 - It may be true, you continue, even here and now. It is fit to be true, it would be well if it were true, it ought to be true, you presently feel. It must be true, something persuasive in you whispers next; and then — as a final result — It shall be held for true, you decide ; it shall be as if true, for you.
Page 8 - Reduced to their most pregnant difference, empiricism means the habit of explaining wholes by parts, and rationalism means the habit of explaining parts by wholes. Rationalism thus preserves affinities with monism, since wholeness goes with union, while empiricism inclines to pluralistic views. No philosophy can ever be anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, a foreshortened bird's-eye view of the perspective of events.
Page 323 - ... every smallest bit of experience is a multum in parvo plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and that a bit of reality when actively engaged in one of these relations is not by that very fact engaged in all the other relations simultaneously. The relations are not all what the French call solidaires with one another. Without losing its identity a thing can either take up or drop another thing...