The institutional structure of antitrust enforcement
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.
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Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation
The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement
Growth Backlash and Spillovers
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