Evolving Market Structure, Conduct, and Policy in Local Telecommunications
Edwin Allen Rosenberg, Michael E. Clements, National Regulatory Research Institute (Ohio State University)
National Regulatory Research Institute, 2000 - Competition - 66 pages
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assumed AT&T basic Bertrand model beneﬁts best response CLECs Competition in Long-Distance competitive fringe ﬁrms competitive levels consumers cost advantages Cournot model degree of market deter entry divestiture dominant ﬁrm dominant ﬁrm-competitive fringe Economics efﬁcient entire market demand entry deterrence Federal Communications Commission ﬁrm-competitive fringe model group of ﬁrms ILEC ILECís implies incentive incumbent interconnection Jean Tirole large ﬁrm Lerner Index limit pricing lLECs long-distance market Long-Distance Telephone marginal cost pricing market power market power problems market price market share monopolist monopoly markets Nash Equilibrium NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH number of ﬁrms oligopoly output potential competitors potential entrant price leadership price-cap regulation product differentiation proﬁt maximizing proﬁtably quantity competition reﬂect Regulatory Economics REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE repeated interaction resale residual demand function result scenario sequential-move serve the entire signiﬁcant single-period strategy structural separation Telecommunications telephone industry telephone markets TIONAL REGULA TORY TORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE unbundled network elements unbundling