Games Real Actors Play: Actor-centered Institutionalism In Policy Research (Google eBook)
Games Real Actors Play provides a persuasive argument for the use of basic concepts of game theory in understanding public policy conflicts. Fritz Scharpf criticizes public choice theory as too narro
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Policy Research in the Face of Complexity
Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions
Decisions by Majority Vote
The union view
Historical sequences of coordination and politics games
Appendix 2 Efficient SelfCoordination in Policy Networks
Ideal types of negotiations
Welfare effects of dictatorial coalitions
Search costs and welfare effects
Varieties of the Negotiating State
Appendix LA GameTheoretical Interpretation
Inflation and unemployment in OECD countries 19731983
About the Book and Author
able achieved actor constellations aggregate agreement analytical assumed assumptions bargaining capacity cell Coase Theorem collective competition concept conflict cooperation coordination game corporate actors Corporatism decisions defined democracy democratic depend discussed distributive distributive justice economic electoral empirical European European Union explanations fact Figure gains game theory game-theoretic grand coalition implies increase individual inflation institutional institutionalism interac interests issues Joint Payoffs Keynesian labor government leading coalition Lindblom macroeconomic majority ment mode of interaction monetarism monetarist move mutual adjustment Nash equilibrium Negative Coordination negotiations networks noncooperative games normative options orientations outcomes Parametric Adjustment parties players policy choices policy processes policy research political Positive Coordination potential preferences Prisoner's Dilemma Problem Solving produce real-world rules Scharpf self-interest sequential sequential game simulation social solution specific stagflation status quo status-quo strategies theory tions tive transaction costs unemployment unilateral action unions veto vote voters wage restraint welfare-theoretic West Germany
Page 38 - ... systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose.
Page 247 - ELABORATED in this book: that people can coordinate with each other without anyone's coordinating them, without a dominant common purpose, and without rules that fully prescribe their relations to each other.
Page 30 - Instead, we should concentrate on specifying small and medium-sized mechanisms for human action and interaction - plausible, frequently observed ways in which things happen.
Page 30 - The development and use of a general framework helps to identify the elements and relationships among these elements that one needs to consider for institutional analysis. Frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. They provide the most general list of variables that should be used to analyze all types of institutional arrangements.
Page 49 - James Duesenberry's quip that "economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about how they don't have any choices to make
Page 247 - A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in...
Page 153 - government by the people" can be only approximated, citizens of democratic societies should expect "government for the people" to confer output-oriented legitimacy on policy-making arrangements. As Scharpf sees it, "output-oriented notions refer to substantive criteria of buon governo, in the sense that effective policies can claim legitimacy if they serve the common...