Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective is the long-awaited third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson, whose influence on philosophy since the 1960s has been deep and broad. His first two collections, published by OUP in the early 1980s, are recognized as contemporary classics. Now Davidson presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations among language, thought, and the world. This new volume offers a rich and rewarding feast for anyone interested in philosophy today, and is essential reading for anyone working on its central topics. |
Contents
First Person Authority 1984 | 3 |
Volume | 5 |
Knowing Ones Own Mind 1987 | 15 |
The Myth of the Subjective 1988 | 39 |
What is Present to the Mind? 1989 | 53 |
Indeterminism and Antirealism 1997 | 69 |
The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self 1998 | 85 |
Intersubjective རའཎྜས | 95 |
A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge 1983 | 137 |
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Common terms and phrases
answer antirealism argued assertability asymmetry attribute basic basis behavior C. I. Lewis Carl Hempel Carnap causal cause claim coherence theory concept of truth contents correct correspondence theory course creature Daniel Dennett Davidson depends describe determined Donald Davidson Dummett empirical entities epistemic epistemology Essay evidence experience explain express fact false Fodor Hempel Hilary Putnam idea identified indeterminacy intention interpreter Jerry Fodor John Searle justified knowledge language linguistic logical mean mental mind Moritz Schlick nature Neurath numbers objects and events observation sentences obvious patterns perception person authority philosophers physical porcupine possible predicates problem propositional attitudes protocol sentences psychological question Quine's rational realism reason reference relations relevant Rorty Schlick seems semantic sensation sense data similar skepticism someone sort speak speaker speech subjective suppose Tarski's theory of truth things thought tion truth conditions Tyler Burge understand utterances W. V. Quine Wittgenstein words wrong