Metaphysic. (System of phil., 2). (Google eBook)

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Contents

Divisions of the subject
21
The natural conception of the universe
22
CHAPTER I
23
Sensation the only evidence of Reality?
24
Being of Things apart from Consciousness Their action on each other
25
Questions of the origin and the nature of reality distinguished
27
Objective relations presuppose the Being of Things
28
89 Pure Being a legitimate abstraction but not applicable to Reality
30
PositionandAffirmationmeaningless apart from relations
31
Position appears to involve the difficulties attaching to creative action
33
Herbarts irrevocable Position
35
Herbarts indifference of Things to relations inconsistent with their en tering into relations
37
CHAPTER II
40
A Thing is taken to be more than its qualities
41
Herbarts conception of the essence of a Thing as asimple Quality
42
A Quality need not be abstract nor dependent on a subject
44
How can what is simple have varying states?
46
The common element in sensations of colour
48
Things only vary within certain limits
50
The movement of consciousness not analogous to the variations of a simple Quality
51
Simple Qualities represented by compound expressions Herbart
52
The isolation of Things a mere abstraction
53
OF THE REAL AND REALITY 25 Things not of the nature ofsimple Qualities
57
A complete conception would include past and future history of Thing
59
Matter as imparting reality to Qualities
60
Matter which has no Qualities can receive none
61
Matter explains nothing if it is mere Position
62
Realis a predicative conception not a subject
64
A Thing as a Law
67
A Law need not be General?
68
What is that which conforms to the Law?
70
Danger of the antithesis between the world of Ideas and Reality
72
Difficulty of expressing the notion of a Law or Idea which is naturally real
74
CHAPTER IV
76
How is change subject to certain limits to be conceived?
77
chaptrr IV
79
Law of Identity does not even prove the continuous existence of Things
80
Bbvafus and ivipyua in two senses
81
Why are consequences realised?
82
The Things must be such realisations
84
The dominant principles of any real world are prescribed by its nature and are not prior to it 149
85
This would only explain development not causation
86
In transeunt action changes in the agent must be noticed by the patient
87
Notion of Becoming compared with notion of states of a persistent Thing
88
Quantitative comparability of factors in every effect
90
Degrees of Intensity of Being
91
OK THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTIoN FAGS 60 No effect due to a single active cause
93
Cause Reason and the Relation which initiates action
95
Modification of Causes and Relation by effect
96
Occasional Causes and Stimuli
99
A causa transiens is only preliminary to action
101
Difficulty of conceiving the passage of a force or state from A to B
103
Origin of erroneous idea that cause and effect must be equal and like
104
Relation of consequence to ground may be synthetic as well as analytic
106
How far must Things be homogeneous in order to react upon each other?
107
Desire to explain all processes as of one kind Likeknown only by like
109
Attempt to dispense with transeunt action Occasionalism
110
Leibnitzs Preestablished Harmony
113
What his completely determined world gains by realisation
115
Complete determinism incredible
116
Corresponding states of different Monads Illustration of the two clocks
118
Operation according to general laws necessary for active causation
120
CHAPTER
123
What is involved in the idea oftranseuntoperation 1a3 69 Pluralism and Monism
124
Separate Things not really independent of each other
126
Unity of Things analytically involved in reciprocal action
127
How their unity is consistent with apparent degrees of independence
128
The relation of the One to the Many cannot be exhibited to Perception
129
Alleged contradiction of regarding the One as the Many
130
The Logical copula inadequate to the relation between the One and the Many
131
Reality subject to Law of Identity in form but not in fact
134
The One and the Many illustrated by Herbarts accidental views
135
Herbart admits multiplicity in the nature of individual Things
137
Leibnitz world when ceasing to be immanent in God has no unity
138
Relations between the contents of ideas can only exist for Thought
140
Variable Relations between Things must be modifications in the things
142
CHAPTER VII
145
We have not to account for the origin of Motion
146
imaginary and illustrative
152
Hegel Schelling WeisseNecessity and Freedom
154
Necessity as an appearance produced within reality Idealism and Realism
157
The Phases of the Idea must be causally connected
158
The Idea generates a mechanical system by which it is realised
161
Realism recognises the necessity of regressive interpretation
163
Subjectivity in relation to the possibility of Knowledge
165
Fichte on the world of Spirits and the world of Things
166
A spiritual nature seems necessary for Things jthey are to be subjects of states
167
Need Things exist at all?
169
As mere media of effects they can hardly be said to exist
171
BOOK II
174
Euclidean Space is what we have to discuss
175
Space is not a Thing Property or Relation
176
Space not merely a Genusconcept
177
Kant on empty Space
179
Kant on Space as given 1S0 105 Why Kant denied the reality of Space
181
Finiteness or Infinity of World do not decide the question
182
Nor does Infinite divisibility of real elements or the reverse
184
Real difficulties What is Space and how are things in it?
186
Do the points of real Space act upon each other?
187
Constructions of Space out of active points
190
Constructions of real Space and hypothesis of subjective Space
191
Nothing gained by the independent reality of Space 194
194
Things in Space on hypothesis of its being subjective
195
Things in an independently existing Space
197
Relations between things and reactions of things
198
The movability of things
200
DEDUCTIONS OF SPACE PACE
202
Spinoza on Consciousness and Extension
203
Limit of what can be done by speculative construction Hegel and Weisse
205
Three questions involved inPsychologicalDeductions of Space
206
Alternatives suggested by idea of subjective Space
209
Can any Space represent what our Space will not?
210
Symbolical spatial arrangements of sounds etc
211
No Space will represent disparate qualities
212
Other Spaces than common Space in what sense possible
214
Geometry dependent on its data
215
AH constructions presuppose the Spaceperception
217
Constructions of straight line plane etc presuppose them
218
The sum of the angles of a triapgle
221
Helmholtz on the possible ignorance of a third dimension
222
Dwellers on a spheresurface and parallel lines
225
Analogy from ignorance of third dimension to ignorance of fourth
226
There cannot be four series perpendicular to each other
229
Extension must be homogeneous
232
Riemannsmultiplicities are not Space unless uniform
235
CHAPTER III
238
The conception of empty Time
239
The connexion of Time with events in it
242
Empty Time Subjective but succession inseparable from Realily
265
Existence of Past and Future
269
Law of Continuity
270
Continuity essential to Becoming
271
Grounds for the Law of Persistence
275
Motion inconceivable without Law of Persistence
278
Possibility of absolute Motion on doctrine of real Space
279
Possibility of absolute Rotation
281
Amount and direction of Motion to be accepted like any constant
282
Difficulty of alleged indifference of Things to change of place
283
On view of phenomenal Space percipient subject with organism is essen tial to occurrence of Motion
285
Which these points are is determined from time to time by the activities
286
Solitary Motion possible if observer is granted
288
State corresponding to a Persistent Motion 28g 171 Motion is not the same as the Measure of Motion
290
Parallelogram of Motions akin to Law of Persistence
291
Parallelogram necessarily true if only motions are considered
293
CHAPTER V
296
Limitation of the problem
297
Descartes and Spinoza on Consciousness and Extension
298
Schelling and Hegel problems attempted by the latter
301
Kant does not connect his views of Matter and of Space
302
Why Kant explained Matter by Force
304
Force involves relation between things
306
Force as a property of one element a figure of speech
308
Kant rightly implies activity on the part of Things not mere sequence according to Law
311
Kants two forces a mere analysis of the position of a thing
313
Still a mechanical system of forces essential and several may attach to each element
316
Idea of communication of Motion
318
Space no selfevident hindrance to action
321
CHAPTER VI
324
Lucretiusdifferences in the Atoms
326
Consequences of the Unity of an extended Atom
328
Notion of unextended AtomsHerbart
331
Herbarts view modifiedthe Atoms not independent of each other
333
Is Matter homogeneous or of several kinds?
335
Homogeneous Matter not proved by constancy of Mass
337
Connexion of the elements with each other in a systematic unity
339
Plurality in space of identical elements merely phenomenal
340
Selfmultiplication of Atomic centres conceivable
343
THE LAWS OF THE ACTIvITIES OF THINGS 198 The square of the distancedifficulties in the radiation of Force
345
No mechanical deduction of a primary Force
348
Herbarts view of the Satisfaction of Force not conclusive
350
Philosophy desires one primary law of action
352
Affinity would naturally correspond to the Distance itself
353
Attempt to account for Square of Distance
355
Can Force depend on motions of acting elements?
357
Does Force require time to take effect at a distance?
358
Causation and TimeReciprocal action
360
Idealism admits no special Laws as absolute
362
Conservation of Mass
363
Constancy of the Sum of Motions
364
Absorption of Cause in Effect
366
Equality and Equivalence distinguished
369
Equivalence does not justify reduction to one process
371
Compensation in interaction of Body and Soul
372
The Principle of Parsimony
375
CHAPTER VIII
378
Possibility of explaining natural processes in detail on the view of subjective Space
380
Success the test of the methods of physical science
381
Mechanism the action of combined elements according to general laws
383
Mechanism as a distinct mode of natural activitya fiction
385
The planetary system light and sound
388
Electricity and Chemistry should not be sharply opposed to Mechanism
390
Motives for forming the conception of a Vital Force
392
Vital Force could not be one for all Organisms
393
Difference between organic and inorganic substances proves nothing about Vital Force
394
A Lifeprinciple would have to operate mechanically
395
Mechanical aspect of Organisms
397
Mechanical view indispensable but not exhaustive
399
Purpose implies a subjectGod the soul
400
Von Baer on purpose in Nature
403
Unity of world determines all modes of action
404
The mechanical order need not exclude progress
405
Is there a fixed number of Natural Kinds?
408
Criticism of the questionIs real existence finite or infinite?
409
Development of the Cosmosonly its general principles a qnestion for Metaphysic
414
Actual development of life a question for Natural History Conclusion
415
book m
418
Reasons for the belief in a Soul 1 Freedom is no reason
420
Mental and physical processes disparate
421
Disparateness no proof of separate psychical substance
422
Unity of the conscious Subject
424
The subject in what sense calledsubstance
426
Kant on the Substantiality of the Soul
427
What the Soul is and the question of its immortality
430
Origin of the Soul may be gradual
432
Ideas of psychical and psychophysical mechanism
435
Interaction between Body and Soul
436
Idea of a bond between Body and Soul
438
The Soul not a resultant of physical actions
439
Meaning of explaining the Soul as a peculiar form of combination between elements
441
Consciousness and Motion in Fechners PsychcPhysik
442
CHAPTER II
445
The physiological stimulus of sensation
446
The conscious sensation
448
Adequate and inadequate stimuli of sense
450
The connexion of various classes of sensation
451
Webers Law
454
Hypotheses as to the reason of Webers Law
455
The socalled chemistry of ideas
456
Simple ideas and their relations
470
The necessary distinction between them
471
Psychophysical attempts to explain ideas of relation 47a 270 Herbarts theory of the psychical mechanism
474
The truer view respecting simple ideas and ideas of relation expressed in Herbartian language
476
The referring activity as producing universal conceptions
477
Attention as an activity of reference
478
Attention and the interest possessed by ideas
479
CHAPTER IV
481
How is the perception of spatial relations possible? 48a 277 Distinctions depending on Space cannot be preserved as such in the Soul
484
A clue needed for the arrangement of impressions by the Soul
485
The extraimpression as a clue or local sign
486
Does the local sign arise in the same nervefibre as the main impression?
488
Local signs must be not merely different but comparable
490
Local signs must be conscious sensations
491
2837 On the local signs connected with visual sensations
493
2889 Local signs connected with the sense of touch
503
How these feelings are associated with movement
506
CHAPTER V
509
The Soul not omnipresent within the body
510
No reason to suppose that it has an action graduated according to dis tance
511
No suitable place can be found for it on the hypothesis that it acts by contact only
512
It must act directly and independently of Space but only at certain necessary points
513
Our ignorance of the special functions of the central nervous organs
517
Application of this view to the organ of language
523
Does memory depend on physical traces left in the brain?
529
Index
537
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Page 423 - Any comparison of two ideas, which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the absolutely indivisible unity of that which compares them...
Page 423 - I should maintain, on the contrary, that such a mode of setting out involves a wilful departure from that which is actually given in experience. A mere sensation without a subject is nowhere to be met with as a fact. It is impossible to speak of a bare movement without thinking of the mass whose movement it is ; and it is just as impossible to conceive a sensation existing without the accompanying idea of that which has it, or, rather, of that which feels it ; for this also is included in the...
Page 432 - this general idealistic conviction; that every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorised place only in a transitory phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further application in human hands hardly needs to be mentioned. We certainly do not know the merits which may give to one existence a claim to eternity, nor the defects which deny it to others 1 .
Page 430 - so far as and so long as the soul knows itself as this identical subject, it is, and is named, simply for that reason, substance. The attempt to find its capacity of thus knowing itself in the numerical unity of another underlying substance is not a process of reasoning which merely fails to reach an admissible aim ; it has no aim at all. That which is not only conceived by others as unity in multiplicity, but knows and makes...

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