Antitrust policy and interest-group politics
This groundbreaking study is the first to apply an analytical model derived from the interest-group theory of regulation to the study of antitrust law and policy. The application of this model which stresses that government intervention in the economy will always benefit some political groups at the expense of others to the analysis of antitrust enables Shughart both to identify important trends in the antitrust arena and demonstrate which groups have benefited most from antitrust legislation. His analysis clearly shows that consumer welfare is often not enhanced by antitrust suits or legislation. Rather, well-organized private interest groups have tended to benefit more, even in cases where consumer welfare is the stated goal of legislation or policy. Divided into three sections, the volume begins by discussing normative and positive theories of antitrust. The author provides an overview of the origins of antitrust law and policy and introduces the interest-group theory of government. The second section explores the various private interests that impinge on antitrust policy: the business community, the antitrust bureaucracy, Congress, the judiciary, and the antitrust bar. Finally, Shughart examines the political economy of antitrust. He shows how antitrust can be used to subvert competition and offers suggestions for reform in the realm of interest group politics. Students of economics and business, as well as professional economists, corporate lawyers, legislators, and business consultants, will find important new insights into the direction taken by antitrust policy during the last few decades.
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The Origins and Critique of Antitrust 11
The InterestGroup Theory of Government
8 other sections not shown
acquisition anticompetitive Antitrust Division Antitrust Enforcement antitrust laws Antitrust Paradox antitrust policy antitrust processes attorneys behavior benefits Bork Bruce Yandle business practices charged Clayton Act collusion commission's committees competitors complaints Congress congressional consumer welfare contracts costs courts dealer decision defendant Department of Justice Dual Enforcement economists effects enforcement activities evidence example Federal Trade Commission firms FTC's groups Ibid illegal incentives increase industry instituted interest-group theory issue Journal of Law judges judicial large number Law and Economics law enforcement Law Review legislative legislature manufacturer market share ment monopoly October Ordover output penalty percent plaintiff Posner predatory pricing price discrimination private antitrust litigation private interests profits public policy reform regulation regulatory rent seeking representatives resale price maintenance retail Richard Richard Posner rivals Robert Robinson-Patman Act Section Sherman Act Shughart Stigler Subvert Competition suggests suppliers theory of government tion titrust Tollison unlawful Utah Pie vertical wealth transfers