Short-Term America: The Causes and Cures of Our Business Myopia
"I strongly recommend Michael T. Jacobs's Short-Term America. . .It is a persuasive and concise argument for how we should correct the problem of impatient capital in this country."-Michael Crichton, Across the Board. "Intelligent and thoughtful. . .This book should be required reading for anyone who runs anything in America, from the White House to Main Street, from Capitol Hill to Wall Street."-Pat Widder, Chicago Tribune. "Short-Term America is a sober, thoughtful, clear-eyed examination of factors undermining American competitiveness."-Peter Baida, New York Times. In this revolutionary new book, Michael Jacobs takes a hard look at why so few American businesses are managed for the long term and why so many shareholders and lenders have abandoned the virtue of patient capital. He describes practices and regulations that pit owners and managers of America's corporations against each other, often at the expense of their mutual long-term prosperity. Jacobs offers provocative proposals to reform investment practices, corporate governance mechanisms, executive compensation plans, and banking regulations that have brought about the short-termism eroding U.S. competitiveness and creating distant, if not adversarial relationships between capital providers and corporations. "A sophisticated and readable critique of the recent corporate takeover mania."-David Warsh, Boston Globe.
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The Commoditization of Corporate
How Corporations Are Really Governed
The Truth about Takeovers
5 other sections not shown
accountability American companies anti-takeover law assets bankers behavior Berkshire Hathaway borrowers capital costs capital providers cash flow commercial compensation competitive competitors corporate governance corporate governance system corporate managers cost of capital cost of equity countries customers debt decisions declined directors dollars economic employees executive compensation fact federal financial services firms foreign Germany global golden parachutes incentive industry institutional investors interest rates investment involved issues Japan Japan and Germany Japanese companies junk bond lenders leveraged buyouts loans long-term major market share maximize ment million money managers myopia nation operate ownership pany percent performance plans poison pills potential problem profits proxy public companies purchase regulations relationships restricted stock restructure returns risk securities securitization sell shareholders short-term soft-dollar stock price strategy takeover top executives trading transactions U.S. banks U.S. companies U.S. financial United venture capital vote Wall Street