Ethics: with The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters

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Hackett Publishing, 1992 - Philosophy - 304 pages
19 Reviews
Since their publication in 1982, Samuel Shirley's translations of Spinoza's Ethics and Selected Letters have been commended for their accuracy and readability. Now with the addition of his new translation of Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect this enlarged edition will be even more useful to students of Spinoza's thought.With The 'Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect' and Selected Letters.
  

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Review: The Ethics/Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect/Selected Letters

User Review  - Kelly Head - Goodreads

The first thing to understand about Spinoza's ethical philosophy is that he holds a deterministic view of the universe (“Nature”), and consequently denies free decision. A bit odd, you might think, to ... Read full review

Review: The Ethics/Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect/Selected Letters

User Review  - Julian Meynell - Goodreads

In my opinion the most important book ever written. It is very difficult for a nonprofessional philosopher to understand, however. It should probably only be read in conjunction with another book ... Read full review

Contents

III
31
IV
152
V
194
VI
201
VII
224
VIII
231
IX
233
X
263
XI
294

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Page 17 - Truly, shepherd, in respect of itself, it is a good life ; but in respect that it is a shepherd's life, it is naught. In respect that it is solitary, I like it very well ; but in respect that it is private, it is a very vile life. Now, in respect it is in the fields, it pleaseth me well ; but in respect it is not in the court, it is tedious.
Page 28 - I understand to be a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.
Page 28 - By SUBSTANCE, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
Page 27 - Those things which have nothing mutually in common with one another cannot through one another be mutually understood, that is to say, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.

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About the author (1992)

Samuel Shirley, (1912-2006), was Classics Exhibitioner of Balliol College, Oxford, and Latin Lecturer at Cardiff University.

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