Removing the Commons: A Lockean Left-Libertarian Approach to the Just Use and Appropriation of Natural ResourcesRemoving the Commons examines the moral condition in which people can remove--through either use or appropriation--natural resources from the commons. This task begins with a robust defense of the view that natural resources initially belong to all people. Granting that natural resources initially belong to all people, it follows that all people have a claim that limits the way in which others may go about taking or removing natural resources from the commons. In assessing these limitations, Eric Roark argues for a Lockean left-libertarian theory of justice in which all people have the right of self-ownership and may only remove natural resources from the commons if they adhere to the Lockean Proviso by leaving “enough and as good” for others. Roark’s account goes beyond existing treatments of the Lockean Proviso by insisting that the duty to leave enough and as good for others applies not merely to those who appropriate natural resources from the commons, but also to those who use natural resources within the commons. Removing the Commons defends a Georgist interpretation of the Lockean Proviso in which those who remove natural resources from the commons must pay the competitive rent of their removal in a fashion that best promotes equal opportunity for welfare. Finally, Roark gives extended consideration to the implications that the developed Lockean Left-Libertarian account of removing natural resources from the commons poses toward both global poverty and environmental degradation. |
Contents
| 1 | |
2 Natural Resources and Artifacts | 27 |
3 Lockean LeftLibertarianism | 41 |
4 Property Rights and Access to the Self | 67 |
5 The Use of Natural Resources Within the Commons | 89 |
6 The Appropriation of Natural Resources from the Commons | 135 |
7 Global Poverty and Environmental Degradation | 149 |
Defining Use | 171 |
| 175 | |
| 181 | |
Common terms and phrases
actions another’s appropriation of natural artifacts benefit bundle of rights cabin chapter claim right competitive rent value concern conditions that govern degradation duty to leave effective liberty endorsement equal initial opportunity equal moral claim example fashion first full competitive value full self-ownership Georgist global poverty Hillel Steiner idea independent moral status Initial Equal Opportunity instance Jan Narveson labor libertarian Locke Locke’s Lockean left-libertarian Lockean Proviso Lois Gibbs Love Canal Michael Otsuka moral conditions governing moral liberty moral power moral protections natural resources initially non-consensual Nozick offer one’s opportunity for welfare Otsuka owed permission Peter Vallentyne physical impingement plausible pollution private owner private ownership rights private property property rights reason removal of natural resources initially belong respect to natural right of access rights in respect Robert Nozick self-owner significant status of agents suggest theory of justice thing tion Toxic Jack unappropriated natural resources users of unappropriated Vallentyne violation