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absurd answer appear argument arises assert belief body causation cause and effect cerning Charon colour comprehend conceive concerning conclusion conjoined connexion betwixt consequently consider constant conjunction continued existence contrary convey custom David Hume degree derived discover distinct distinguish efficacy ence endeavour entirely equal examine experience explain external faculty fancy farther feel finite extension force and vivacity friends give human Hume idea of extension identity imagination impres indivisible inference infinite divisibility infinite number influence instances ject John Home judgment kind King of Prussia letter Lord Marshal manner memory mind motion nature never nexion objects observe operation opinion ourselves particular passions perceive perceptions perfectly person philosophers possible present impression pretend principle probability proceed produce qualities question reason reflection regard resemblance rience right line Rousseau sceptical SECT sensation senses sensible sion solidity substance suppose thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible transition twill
Page 317 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 337 - Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium...
Page 33 - If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste.
Page 225 - A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 26 - Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one.
Page 109 - ... twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle.
Page 21 - ... it had never been conveyed to him by his senses ? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can ; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions, though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.
Page 317 - If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.
Page 15 - By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.