The Strategy of Conflict

Front Cover
Harvard University Press, Jan 1, 1980 - Political Science - 309 pages
13 Reviews
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory‚e"the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
  

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Review: The Strategy of Conflict

User Review  - Jonathan Jeckell - Goodreads

For a book this old, written by a founder in the field, and fundamental to a range of fields people have put a lot of effort into understanding (nuclear deterrence for example) this book had a lot of ... Read full review

Review: The Strategy of Conflict

User Review  - Raj Agrawal - Goodreads

[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique Ė only as some words on how I engaged ... Read full review

Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy
3
An Essay on Bargaining
21
Bargaining Communication and Limited War
53
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
83
Enforcement Communication and Strategic
119
Game Theory and Experimental Research
162
Randomization of Promises and Threats
175
The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
187
The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
207
Surprise Attack and Disarmament
230
A Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
257
B For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game
267
Reinterpretation of a Solution Concept
291
INDEX
305
Copyright

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About the author (1980)

Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.

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