Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners Or Losers? |
Common terms and phrases
assume ASYMMETRIES IN INTERNATIONAL Bertrand competition Brander and Spencer calculated Centre for Economic CEPR Discussion Papers cost asymmetries cost competitive cost of funds Cournot Competition Cournot duopoly deadweight loss demand function domestic firms Duke of York Eaton and Grossman Economic Policy Research ex ante game ex post game export subsidies export tax factors of production firms compete first-order condition foreign firm foreign government free trade GOVERNMENTS HELP WINNERS Gruenspecht 1988 home and foreign home firm home government home subsidy implications International Economics INTERNATIONAL SUBSIDY GAMES Journal of International LEO Svensson level of welfare linear demands Markusen maximising Meza negative oligopolistic oligopoly optimal ex post optimal policy output levels post subsidy price of government profit shifting reaction function Section shadow price shows social opportunity cost social welfare function strategic substitutes subsidy is positive subsidy payments surprisingly low values threshold value trade theory welfare function