Changing Corporate Governance Practices in China and Japan: Adaptations of Anglo-American Practices
Facing rapid globalization, it became evident that the traditional Chinese corporate governance mechanisms, which were heavily influenced by European and Japanese counterparts, had become obsolete. More transparent corporate governance mechanisms must be adopted to support China's continuing economic growth. In Japan, to public criticism that its bank-based corporate governance practices were responsible for the prolonged recession in the 1990s, the Japanese government and corporations undertook massive reforms of corporate governance mechanisms. In China and Japan, the focal point of the reforms, which have continued in the 2000s, has been the transplantation of Anglo-American corporate governance practices. However, because of institutional realities, local business practices, cultural differences and the history of corporate governance in these countries, China and Japan cannot implement Anglo-American mechanisms as instituted, for example, in the United States. With contributions from well-known academics from China, Japan and North America, this book discusses issues associated with the transplantation efforts and the selective adaptations that have taken place in corporate governance practices in China and Japan.
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Article assembly firm assets bank-based board of directors bureaucrats capital Chapter China China's listed companies Company Law company's corporate control corporate governance mechanisms corporate governance practices corporate governance reform corporate governance system corporatization CSRC decision economic effective efficiency employees enterprises example firm's foreign Guidelines holding companies hostile takeover implemented increase independent directors industrial firms information disclosure investment issues Japan Japan Post Japan's corporate governance Japanese banks Japanese corporations Japanese firms keiretsu group large shareholders listed firms Livedoor M&A activity M&A ratio majority mergers minority shareholders misstatement monitoring Morck Nakamura norms operations outstanding shares percent performance poison pills problems production profits regulations relationships role sector securities selective adaptation Shanghai Stock Exchange shareholder value maximization significant SOEs stable shareholders stakeholders state-owned Steel Partners Stock Exchange stock market structure supervisory board suppliers target firms Tobin's q Tokyo Tokyo Stock Exchange Toyota tracking stock transactions voting Wang