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action admitted appears asserted Athenian Athens Bentham Cairnes capable character civilized common condition conduct consequences consider Constitution cultivation democracy Deontology desire despotism doctrine duty England equally ethical evil exist expediency fact faculties favor feeling foreign France freedom French give Grecian Greece Grote habit happiness human idea improvement individual influence injustice institutions interest justice Lamartine legislation liberty Lord Brougham Louis Blanc Louis Philippe mankind means ment mind mode moral philosophy moral rules nation nature never object obligation oligarchical opinion pain party Pericles person philosophy Plato pleasure political popular practical present principle of utility produce profess Provisional Government punishment question reason regard Revolution selfish sense sentiment Slave Power slavery social society Socrates Sparta standard supposed sympathy theory Theramenes thing thought Thucydides tion truth unjust utilitarian virtue Whewell Whewell's women word writers wrong
Page 310 - But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
Page 349 - No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.
Page 312 - It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
Page 311 - ... no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Page 318 - ... finds sources of inexhaustible interest in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and present, and their prospects in the future.
Page 165 - The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may...
Page 323 - In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Page 333 - The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the precepts of every practical art, admit of indefinite improvement, and, in a progressive state of the human mind, their improvement is perpetually going on.
Page 324 - ... may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it ; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on...
Page 325 - He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.