The Uses of Argument

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Cambridge University Press, Jul 7, 2003 - Philosophy - 247 pages
4 Reviews
Traditionally, logic has been claimed to be 'the science of rational argument', but the relevance to our everyday disputes of the formal logician's results has remained unclear. The abstract character of traditional logic cuts the subject off from practical considerations; Mr Toulmin enquires why this is so, and shows how an alternative conception can be of more general value. Starting from an examination of the actual procedures in different fields of argument - the practice, as opposed to the theory, of logic - he discloses a richer variety than is allowed for by any available system. He argues that jurisprudence rather than mathematics should be the logician's model in analysing rational procedures, and that logic should be a comparative and not a purely formal study. These suggestions lead to conclusions which many will consider controversial; though they will also be widely recognized as interesting and illuminating. This book extends into general philosophy lines of enquiry already sketched by Mr Toulmin in his earlier books on ethics and the philosophy of science. The ordinary reader will find in it the same clarity and intelligibility; and the professional philosopher will acknowledge the same power to break new ground (and circumvent old difficulties) by posing fresh and stimulating questions.
  

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Review: The Uses of Argument

User Review  - Eric - Goodreads

Toulmin's book offers a critique of the norms and trends dominating philosophical logic circa 1958. Specifically, he is concerned with the limitations of such logic's increasing analytical ... Read full review

Review: The Uses of Argument

User Review  - Larry - Goodreads

At first I thought too simplified and narrow. Later after doing more and explaining the scientific process I decided that he has improved our ability to talk to each other about a basically messy process. Read full review

Contents

Fields of Argument and Modals
11
The Phases of an Argument
15
Impossibilities and Improprieties
21
Force and Criteria
28
The FieldDependence of Our Standards
33
Questions for the Agenda
36
Probability
41
I Know I Promise Probably
44
The Peculiarities of Analytic Arguments
118
Some Crucial Distinctions
125
The Perils of Simplicity
131
Working Logic and Idealised Logic
135
An Hypothesis and Its Consequences
136
The Verification of This Hypothesis
143
The Irrelevance of Analytic Criteria
153
Logical Modalities
156

Improbable But True
49
Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims
53
The Labyrinth of Probability
57
Probability and Expectation
61
ProbabilityRelations and Probabilification
66
Is the Word Probability Ambiguous?
69
ProbabilityTheory and Psychology
77
The Development of Our ProbabilityConcepts
82
The Layout of Arguments
87
Data and Warrants
89
Backing Our Warrants
95
Ambiguities in the Syllogism
100
The Notion of Universal Premisses
105
The Notion of Formal Validity
110
Analytic and Substantial Arguments
114
Logic as a System of Eternal Truths
163
SystemBuilding and Systematic Necessity
174
The Origins of Epistemological Theory
195
Further Consequences of Our Hypothesis
201
Transcendentalism
206
Phenomenalism and Scepticism
211
Substantial Arguments Do Not Need Redeeming
214
The Justification of Induction
217
Intuition and the Mechanism of Cognition
221
The Irrelevance of the Analytic Ideal
228
Conclusion
233
References
239
Index
241
Copyright

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