Liberal virtues: citizenship, virtue, and community in liberal constitutionalism
Liberal democracy is often defended because it secures freedom, order, and prosperity. Without slighting these solid achievements, this book responds to those who worry that the theory and practice of free self-government neglect the importance of community and citizen virtue. Macedo offers a critical interpretation and original defense of the great tradition of individual freedom associated with John Locke and the founders of the American republic. He defends a theory of public justification, and explains how the legal and political institutions of liberal democracy embody a collective commitment to reasonableness. He concludes with the types of personalities and societies associated with life in a pluralistic, open, and tolerant liberal society. This provocative work will be of interest to scholars and laypeople concerned with the moral aspirations of contemporary democracy.
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The Flight from Liberalism
Liberalism and Public Justification
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