The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, Mar 20, 2006 - Philosophy
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
 

Contents

Section 1
20
Section 2
41
Section 3
75
Section 4
82
Section 5
97
Section 6
126
Section 7
160
Section 8
163
Section 11
189
Section 12
209
Section 13
231
Section 14
249
Section 15
252
Section 16
254
Section 17
280
Section 18
295

Section 9
171
Section 10
184
Section 19
299
Section 20
321

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