Plato and the Divided Self
Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, Charles Brittain
Cambridge University Press, Feb 16, 2012 - History - 396 pages
"With every day, and from both sides of my intelligence, the moral and the intellectual, I thus drew steadily nearer to that truth by whose partial discovery I have been doomed to such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one, but truly two. I say two, because the state of my own knowledge does not pass beyond that point. Others will follow, others will outstrip me on the same lines, and I hazard the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens. Robert Louis Stevenson, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde1 Most of the papers in this volume originated at two conferences, one held in 2005 at the University of Toronto and one in 2006 at Cornell University.2 As organizers we then commissioned another seven papers in order to produce a much more wide-ranging, if still far from comprehensive volume.3 Philosophical accounts of the tripartite soul in Plato have traditionally focussed on the Republic: while that dialogue remains central to many of the papers in this volume, readers will also find discussions of other dialogues featuring soul-partition (including Sheffield on the Phaedrus, Lorenz on the Timaeus, and Brisson on the Laws) and other relevant psychological investigations (Dorion on the Gorgias, Vasiliou on the Phaedo, Sheffield on the Symposium, Moss on the Philebus). Also included are three case studies of uses of the tripartite theory within the later Platonic tradition (Opsomer on Plutarch, Schiefsky on Galen, and Emilsson on Plotinus). The reader will thus be able to judge to what extent these various sources present a constant, unitary theory - a unitary and stable Platonic Psychology - underlying the developments and revisions in Plato's thinking, and in the views of his successors"--Provided by publisher.
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Plato's Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias
Thomas K. Johansen
No preview available - 2004
action activity adeimantus akrasia analogy anger appears appetitive argues argument Aristotle Aristotle’s athenian stranger beliefs bipartition Bobonich body charioteer Charmides claim cognitive conception conflict constitution courage deflationist Demiurge desires dialogues discussion distinct elements enkrateia epithumêtikon epithumia erôs explain external fact fear Forms Galen Glaucon Glaucus Gorgias harmony heautou honor horse human soul idea images immortal intellect internal involved irrational Irwin justice kaª Kallipolis kind Laws liver logistikon moderation moral motivations nature non-rational object ofthe soul oligarchic one’s oneself passage passions perception person Phaedo Phaedrus Phd-philosopher Philebus philosophers physical training Plato pleasures and pains Plotinus Plutarch Posidonius principle Proclus Protagoras psychic psychological question rational reason reference Republic responsible role rule seems sense sensory simply Socrates Socrates says sort soul-parts soul’s speak spirit Stobaeus suggests Symposium theory things thumos Timaeus understanding unity virtue virtuous wisdom world soul