What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
agreeable altogether analogous appear applied argument Aristippus Aristotle association attention beauty Berkeleian Burke cerning chiefly circumstances colors common conceive concerning conclusions Condillac connexion consciousness consequence considered criticism Descartes doctrine effect employed epithet Essay existence experience expression extension external faculties fancy farther feelings former genius habits human mind Hume ideas illustration imagination impressions innate ideas instances intellectual judgment knowledge language Leibnitz literal Locke Locke's Longinus Lord Bacon Malebranche material matter means ment metaphorical metaphysical moral nature notions Novum Organum objects observation occasion opinion origin passage peculiar perceived perception phenomena philosophical Philosophy of Mind phrase physical picturesque Plato pleasure poet present primary qualities principles produced qualities readers reason Reid Reid's remark respect rience science of mind seems sensation sense sensibility speak species speculations sublime supposed taste theory thing thought tion truth various word writers
Page 125 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 334 - The mole's dim curtain, and the lynx's beam: Of smell, the headlong lioness between, And hound sagacious on the tainted green; Of hearing, from the life that fills the flood, To that which warbles through the vernal •wood; The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine! Feels at each thread, and lives along the line...
Page 60 - ... about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without ; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds ; which we, being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.
Page 313 - Or let my lamp at midnight hour Be seen in some high lonely tower, Where I may oft outwatch the Bear...
Page 400 - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
Page 72 - It is true, indeed, that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the sense, — except the intellect itself.
Page 275 - On a rock, whose haughty brow Frowns o'er old Conway's foaming flood, Robed in the sable garb of woe, With haggard eyes the poet stood; (Loose his beard and hoary hair Streamed like a meteor to the troubled air;) And with a master's hand and prophet's fire Struck the deep sorrows of his lyre: 'Hark, how each giant oak and desert cave Sighs to the torrent's awful voice beneath!
Page 289 - Awake, /Eolian lyre, awake, And give to rapture all thy trembling strings. From Helicon's harmonious springs A thousand rills their mazy progress take ; The laughing flowers, that round them blow, Drink life and fragrance as they flow. Now the rich stream of music winds along, Deep, majestic, smooth, and strong, Through verdant vales, and Ceres...
Page 66 - Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas or impressions on the sense ; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception ? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself.