Rules, Reasons, and NormsPhilip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book deals with the rule-following character of thought. The second discusses the many factors to which choice is rationally responsive - and by reference to which choice can be explained - consistently with being under the control of thought. The third examines the implications of this multiple sensitivity for the normative regulation of social affairs. Thus the volume covers a large swathe of territory, ranging from metaphysics to philosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation. The connections that Pettit makes between these areas are original and illuminating. Each part of the book develops a key theme. The first is that thought succeeds in following rules - and overcomes Wittgenstein's rule-following problem - so far as it is response-dependent; it is a sort of enterprise that is accessible only to creatures like us for whom certain responses are primitive and shared. The second is that while human choice may be sensitive to discursive reasons, as we would expect in a thinking subject, it can at the same time be subject to the control - the virtual control, in the model developed here - of rational self-interest. And the third is that the rational interest of agents in achieving esteem in the eyes of others, and in avoiding disesteem, exercises a virtual form of control that can explain the emergence of norms and various other aspects of social life. |
Contents
| 3 | |
The Reality of RuleFollowing | 26 |
Realism and ResponseDependence | 55 |
Noumenalism and ResponseDependence | 96 |
Defining and Defending Social Holism | 116 |
A Theory of Normal and Ideal Conditions | 135 |
Overview | 159 |
Three Aspects of Rational Explanation | 177 |
The Virtual Reality of homo economicus | 222 |
Functional Explanation and Virtual Selection | 244 |
The Capacity to Have Done Otherwise | 257 |
116 | 289 |
Rational Choice Perspectives | 308 |
The Cunning of Trust | 344 |
Enfranchising Silence | 369 |
Chilling and Cautionary Tales | 378 |
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Common terms and phrases
action actual agent anthropocentric approval argue assume assumption of desiderative attitude-based behaviour biconditional Cambridge capacity causally relevant claim colour common concept of redness conform constraints context Crispin Wright decision theory dependent derivation desiderative structure disapproval discourse disposition distinct economic entities epistemic ethics committees ethocentric example fact favourable conditions folk psychology Frank Jackson functional explanation functionalist Geoffrey Brennan global response-dependence human ideal identify inclination instantiated institutional institutional ethics committee involved John Braithwaite Jon Elster least look red means motivating normal norms noumenalism object option Oxford University Press particular pattern person Philip Pettit position possible predicate prefer present priori prisoner's dilemmas problem programming propositions prospects question rational choice rational choice theory realism reason reliance resilience response role rule rule-following salient sanctions satisfy self-interest self-regarding semantically sensations sense social holism someone sort standards strategy Suppose thesis things tion trustor trustworthiness unfavourable