The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in AmericaThis volume presents a network of social power, indicating that theories inspired by C.Wright Mills are far more accurate views about power in America than those of Mills's opponents. Dr. Domhoff shows how and why coalitions within the power elite have involved themselves in such policy issues as the Social Security Act (1935) and the Employment Act (1946), and how the National Labor Relations Act (1935) could pass against the opposition of every major corporation. The book descri bes how experts worked closely with the power elite in shaping the plansfor a post-World War II world economic order, in good part realized during the past 30 years. Arguments are advanced that the fat cats who support the Democrats cannot be understood in terms of narrow self-interest, and that moderate conservatives dominated policy-making under Reagan. |
Contents
SOCIAL NETWORKS POWER AND THE STATE | 1 |
Liberalism Marxism and State Theory | 6 |
States and Social Classes | 9 |
DOES IT MATTER WHO GOVERNS? | 17 |
Indicators of Power | 19 |
Uncertainty in Organizations | 20 |
The Cohesion of Class Segments | 22 |
States and Social Democrats | 25 |
The Who Why and How of the IMF | 159 |
Discussion and Conclusion | 181 |
STATE AUTONOMY AND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946 AN EMPIRICAL ATTACK ON A THEORETICAL FANTASY | 187 |
Conflict over the Employment Bill | 196 |
Conclusion | 201 |
CLASS SEGMENTS AND TRADE POLICY 19171962 A CHALLENGE TO PLURALISTS AND STRUCTURAL MARXISTS | 205 |
The Pluralists | 206 |
The Structural Marxist | 208 |
The Need for State Unity | 26 |
Conclusion | 28 |
BUSINESS LEADERS EXPERTS AND THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT | 29 |
Corporate Liberalism and Mills | 32 |
The Distortion of CorporateLiberal Theory | 40 |
The Social Security Act of 1935 | 44 |
THE WAGNER ACT AND CLASS CONFLICT 18971948 | 65 |
The Origins and Tribulations of Collective Bargaining | 71 |
Labor Policy in the Early New Deal | 79 |
Who Wrote the Wagner Act? | 91 |
Why Did It Pass? | 96 |
Implications and Conclusions | 104 |
DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST 19401942 A CRITIQUE OF KRASNERS THEORY OF AMERICAN STATE AUTONOMY | 107 |
Krasners Theory and Findings | 108 |
The Council on Foreign Relations and the National Interest | 113 |
Discussion | 144 |
THE RULING CLASS DOES RULE THE STATE AUTONOMY THEORY OF FRED BLOCK AND THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNATIONAL M... | 153 |
Blocks Theory | 155 |
Trade Policy in the Interwar Years | 209 |
Postwar Trade Policies | 210 |
The Trade Expansion Act | 217 |
Conclusion | 222 |
WHICH FAT CATS SUPPORT DEMOCRATS? | 225 |
Right Turn and the Decline of the Democrats | 226 |
Politics and Policies | 229 |
Fat Cats and Democrats | 232 |
The South and the Growth Machines | 235 |
Jews and Democrats | 245 |
THE DECLINE OF DISRUPTION AND THE RETURN OF CONSERVATISM | 257 |
Disruption and Power | 260 |
Was Business Disorganized? | 264 |
The Rise of CapitalLabor Conflict | 276 |
ENVOI | 283 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 287 |
307 | |
Other editions - View all
The Power Elite and the State: How Policy is Made in America G. William Domhoff No preview available - 1990 |