Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Vermont: Reported by the Judges of Said Court, Agreeably to a Statute Law of the State, Volume 4 |
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action admitted aforesaid agent appear assumpsit attachment attorney auditors bill bond brought cause charge CHITTENDEN Chittenden county claim commenced common law consideration considered contended contract conveyance copy county court court of equity covenant coverture creditor damages dant debt debtor decided decision declaration deed defendant defendant's delivered demand discharge dollars ejectment equity evidence execution facts February feme covert fendant FRANKLIN fraudulent grantor intended issue January John John Bolton judge judgement jurisdiction jury justice land levy liable lien March ment Montpelier Morristown mortgage notice objection officer opinion paid parties paupers payable payment person plaintiff plea pleaded possession premises principle promissory note prove question received record recover rendered scire facias sheriff statute statute of limitations sufficient suit surety term testimony thereon tiel tiff tion town trespass trial verdict void William Eames witness writ
Popular passages
Page 401 - C. 578, in an action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note, the plaintiff proved a joint and several note made by the defendant and another person.
Page 218 - But where a statute is general, and thereby any prerogative, right, title or interest is divested or taken from the king, in such case he shall not be bound ; unless the statute is made by express words, to extend to him.
Page 160 - To constitute an ouster of him who was seised, the disseisor must have the actual exclusive occupation of the land, claiming to hold it against him who was seised, or he must actually turn him out of possession.
Page 32 - But a general verdict can only be set right by a new trial : which is no more than having the cause more deliberately considered by another jury ; when there is a reasonable doubt, or perhaps a certainty, that justice has not been done.
Page 423 - State, signed and sealed by the party granting the same, having good and lawful authority thereunto and signed by two or more witnesses, and acknowledged by such grantor or grantors before a justice of the peace, and recorded, at length, in the clerk's office of the town, in which such lands, tenements or hereditaments lie, SHALL BE VALID TO PASS THE SAME, without any other act or ceremony in law whatever.
Page 402 - Johns. 183, and the court said the holder of a bill of exchange need not show a demand of payment of the acceptor any more than of the maker of a note. It is the business of the acceptor to show that he was ready at the day and place appointed, but that no one came to receive the money, and that he was always ready afterwards to pay.
Page 219 - The general principle is that laches is not imputable to the government; and this maxim is founded, not in the notion of extraordinary prerogative, but upon a great public policy. The government can transact its business only through its agents ; and its fiscal operations are so various, and its agencies so numerous and scattered, that the utmost vigilance would not save the public from the most serious losses, if the doctrine of laches can be applied to its transactions.
Page 323 - It is a general principle," said MARSHALL, CJ, in Williams v. Peyton's Lessees, 4 Wheat. 79, "that the party who sets up a title must furnish the evidence to support it. If the validity of a deed depends on an act in pais, the party claiming under that deed is as much bound to prove the performance of the act as he would be bound to prove any matter of record on which its validity might depend. It forms a part of his title. It is a link in the chain which is essential to its continuity, and which...
Page 130 - the principles and rules of the common law, as now universally known and understood, are so strong against fraud in every shape, that the common law would have attained every end proposed by the statutes 13 Eliz. c. 5, and 27 Eliz. c. 4. The former of these statutes relates to creditors only : the latter to purchasers. These statutes cannot receive too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud.
Page 248 - The covenant for title is an assurance to the purchaser, that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to convey, viz.