The Rebel's Dilemma

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University of Michigan Press, 1998 - Business & Economics - 514 pages
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Since the mid 1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collection action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the full richness of collective action theories to bear on the many complex problems of collective dissent.
". . . a significant contribution to the understanding of collective behavior, protest, and rebellion." --Choice
"The book is interesting and thought-provoking, and its insights extend beyond the narrow subject of rebellion to help illuminate many issues related to organizing groups to undertake collective action." --Public Choice
"[Lichbach's] book is monumental and pivotal. . . . [It] consolidates over three decades of research on collective action problems and sets the agenda for future studies of collective dissent and rebellion. . . . [This] book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution. . . . [This] book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution." --American Political Science Review
"For scholars interested in game-theoretic analyses of politics . . . essential reading." --Manus I. Midlarsky, Journal of Politics
"Lichbach has to be praised for providing valuable insight on the logic of collective dissent. . . ." --Political Studies
Mark Irving Lichbach is Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado.
  

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Contents

The Problem Defined
3
12 The Deprived Actor Research Program
4
13 The Collective Action Research Program
5
Applied Students of Collective Dissent
7
Pure Theorists of Collective Action
11
The Approach Adopted
15
The Rebels Dilemma
16
Solutions to the Rebels Dilemma
19
5234 Political Origins
149
524 Autonomy
155
525 Stability
157
526 Concentration
158
Hierarchy
167
612 The Origins of Entrepreneurial Activity
171
613 The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Activity
175
62 Locate Principals or Patrons
177

The Origins of Collective Action
22
The Outcomes of Collective Action
28
25 Appraising Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent
30
Market
35
31 Increase Benefits
36
32 Lower Costs
38
322 LowCost Collective Dissent
39
323 The Opportunity Costs of Collective Dissent
42
324 The Fixed Costs of Collective Dissent
45
325 Dissidents Minimize Costs
46
326 Entrepreneurs Minimize Costs
47
33 Increase Resources
48
34 Improve the Productivity of Tactics
50
343 Targets
52
344 Tactics
53
Collective Violence and Nonviolence
54
3451 Why Collective Violence Is Used
55
3452 When Collective Violence Is Used
59
35 Reduce the Supply of the Public Good
62
361 The Dissidents Calculus
64
362 Estimating the Probability of Winning
66
3622 The States Weakness
68
363 The Dissident Groups Strategy
74
364 The States Strategy
78
365 The Competition between State and Opposition
79
Military Coups
80
37 Increase the Probability of Making a Difference
82
371 The Dissidents Calculus
83
372 The Dissident Groups Strategy
84
38 Use Incomplete Information
86
382 The Dissident Groups Public Relations Calculus
88
3821 Publicity
89
3822 Illusions
91
3823 Ideology
92
3824 Symbols
93
383 The States Public Relations Calculus
95
39 Increase Risk Taking
96
310 Increase Team Competition between Enemies
99
31012 States
101
31013 Other States
102
3103 The Consequences of Countermobilization
104
311 Restrict Exit
105
312 Change the Type of Public Good
107
3122 Seek Nonrival Public Goods
108
Community
111
Build a Bandwagon
114
4121 The Temporal Diffusion of Collective Dissent
116
4122 The Spatial Diffusion of Collective Dissent
118
Overcome Pecuniary SelfInterest
120
421 Process Orientation
121
422 OtherRegardingness
124
Contract
129
512 TitForTat
133
52 The Social Origins of Social Contracts
134
521 Longevity
136
522 Homogeneity
138
523 Preexisting Organization
141
5231 Formal Organization
145
5232 Informal Organization
146
5233 Social Origins
148
622 Why Patrons Help Dissidents
178
623 Which Patrons Help Dissidents
180
6232 The State as an Ally
182
6233 Nonstate Domestic Actors as Allies
188
6234 External Actors as Allies
189
624 What if Patrons Help Dissidents
191
63 Reorganize
193
Form an Exclusionary Club
194
Shape an Efficacious Group
197
Create a Federal Structure
200
64 Increase Team Competition among Allies
201
641 The Forms of Competition
202
642 The Causes of Competition
203
643 The Courses of Competition
206
644 The Consequences of Competition
208
65 Impose Monitor and Enforce Agreements
210
652 Monitor Defections
211
653 Administer Selective Incentives
215
The Centrality of Selective Incentives
216
Rebels Seek Selective Incentives
217
Politics
226
A NonSolution?
238
654 Administer Selective Disincentives
241
Solutions as Politics The Origins of Collective Action
247
711 Apolitical Production Functions
248
712 Political Games
251
72 The Revolutionary Conflict between States and Dissidents
253
The Rebels Dilemma
254
The States Dilemma
256
723 The Rebels Dilemma and the States Dilemma
258
Solutions as Pathologies The Outcomes of Collective Action
261
82 The Unintended Consequences of Dissident Organization
263
822 The Universality of the Iron Laws
273
823 Overcoming the Iron Laws
274
Evaluating Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent
279
Predictability
281
921 The Complexity of the Rebels Dilemma
282
9222 Preference Falsification
284
9223 The GrievanceCollective Dissent Linkage
286
923 The Consequences for Evaluating CA Theories
289
Lakatos and Popper
293
931 The Criteria
294
932 The Criteria Applied
298
9321 Market
299
9322 Community
309
9323 Contract
311
9324 Hierarchy
315
933 The Criterias Results
320
94 Summary Evaluation
323
Improving Collective Action Theories of Collective Dissent
325
102 Explore the Macro
330
Groups
332
Politics
336
Domination and Legitimacy
337
A Final Perspective
339
Notes
345
References
453
Author Index
495
Subject Index
505
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About the author (1998)

Lichbach is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside.

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