War in Palestine, 1948: Israeli and Arab Strategy and Diplomacy

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Taylor & Francis, Jan 31, 2004 - History - 512 pages
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Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.

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About the author (2004)

David Tal is a lecturer at the Department of History and at the Security Studies Program, Tel Aviv University. He teaches modern military and diplomatic history and has published articles in various professional journals on Israeli security matters and international involvement in the Middle East. His book, Israel's Conception of Current Security: Origins and Development, 1949-1956, was published in 1998. He has also recently edited The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East.

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