A Realist Conception of Truth

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Cornell University Press, Apr 1, 1997 - Philosophy - 274 pages
2 Reviews
One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for truth). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas Alston attacks.
  

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Review: A Realist Conception of Truth: The Transformation of an Occupational Drinking Culture

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A must read for any student of modern developments in theories of truth Read full review

Review: A Realist Conception of Truth: The Transformation of an Occupational Drinking Culture

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A must read for any student of modern developments in theories of truth Read full review

Contents

Why Music? i
9
What Music?
14
The Stimulation Model
30
Helens Way
42
Margarets Way Tibbys Way
68
So Whats to Understand?
93
Surface and Depth
124
How Music Moves
146
Are There Counterexamples to the Ideal Justifiability Conception? 799
199
The Concept of an Ideal Epistemic Situation Presupposes the Concept of Truth 204
204
An Intensional Argument against the Claim 208
208
Replies to the Intensional Argument 211
211
An Epistemic Reinterpretation of Content 214
214
Back to Dummett
219
Realist and Antirealist Prospects for Determining Truth Value 224
224
A Nonconceptual Epistemic Theory of Truth 228
228

Hearing the Emotions
173
io The Profundity of Music
202
Works Cited
219
Index
223
Alethic Realism 5
5
Alethic Realism and Metaphysical Realism 65
65
An Epistemological Objection to Alethic Realism 85
85
Dummetts Verificationist Alternative to Alethic Realism 103
103
Putnams ModelTheoretic Argument 132
132
Putnam on Conceptual Relativity 162
162
Epistemic Conceptions of Truth 188
188
Hi Ideal Epistemic Conditions i 792
192
Ideal Epistemic Conditions 2 196
196
Doing without Truth 231
231
Reasons for DeEmphasizing Truth 255
233
Why Truth Is Important 235
235
Knowledge and Justification 240
240
Justification without Truth
248
Troubles with Deontological Conceptions of Justification
252
Problems with Any Truth free Justification
253
Stich on the Unimportance of Truth
258
Epilogue
262
Bibliography
265
Index
269
Copyright

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