Japanese Law: Readings in the Political Economy of Japanese LawJ. Mark Ramseyer Japanese Law is a collection of the finest research on Japanese political economy, with a particular emphasis on those empirical projects that use the best in current social scientific theory. The result is a truly multi-disciplinary project, including not just work in law, but in political science and economics as well. |
Contents
Mathew D McCubbins and Gregory W Noble 1995 The Appearance | 5 |
Setsuo Miyazawa 1991 Administrative Control of Japanese Judges in Philip | 272 |
Always Loses Southern California Law Review 72 pp 57195 | 273 |
Copyright | |
7 other sections not shown
Common terms and phrases
abdication administrative guidance American appointed Association budget bureaucrats cabinet career cartels Chiyonofuji coalition coefficients competition constitutional core firm corporate decisions Diet directors economic effect elder electoral employees example executive factions Finance gasoline Gregory W Haley Hanrei jihō High Court imperial Japan important incentives industrial policy institutional Japanese judges Japanese law judge's judicial independence judiciary Jusco Justice keiretsu Keizai Kitanofuji Large-Scale Retail Stores LEGAL STUDIES legislators Liberal Democratic Party Lions Oil loans LSRSL mainstream majority Mark Ramseyer Mathew McCubbins ment Ministry MITI MITI's Miwa Nihon ordered probit Organization Osaka party percent policies for SMEs political politicians posts postwar Prefecture promotion regression Retail Stores Law role Rosenbluth rules Satō Secretariat sector share Small Business SMEs sokatsu structure sumo suppliers supra note Supreme Court Table tion Tokyo turnover University Press Upham variables venture capital wrestlers yokozuna