Essays in Radical Empiricism (Google eBook)

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Longmans, Green, and Company, 1922 - Experience - 282 pages
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Review: Essays in Radical Empiricism

User Review  - Vladimir - Goodreads

Somewhat more difficult to read than Pragmatism or Principles of Psychology. (Note to publishers: do not hesitate to translate all the Latin and German quotes.) Most of what he talks about here has ... Read full review

Review: Essays in Radical Empiricism

User Review  - Marcus Lira - Goodreads

I like the first chapter quite a lot, in which he presents consciousness as a function, and not as an entity. Read full review

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Page 170 - thoughts' and 'feelings' can be active, their activity terminates in the activity of the body, and only through first arousing its activities can they begin to change those of the rest of the world.
Page ix - The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.
Page xii - The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves. The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated...
Page 23 - subjective' we say that the experience represents; as 'objective' it is represented. What represents and what is represented is here numerically the same; but we must remember that no dualism of being represented and representing resides in the experience per se. In its pure state, or when isolated, there is no self-splitting of it into consciousness and what the consciousness is 'of.' Its subjectivity and objectivity are functional attributes solely, realized only when the experience is 'taken...
Page 2 - consciousness," when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing "soul
Page 37 - I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them.
Page 56 - I walk, with an answering term of the others; why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That percept was what I meant, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention.
Page 93 - Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories.
Page 4 - My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 'pure experience...
Page 33 - I account for all such facts by calling this whole train of experiences unreal, a mental train. Mental fire is what won't burn real sticks; mental water is what won't necessarily (though of course it may) put out even a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they won't cut real wood. Mental triangles are pointed, but their points won't wound. With 'real...

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