Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved ConflictIt is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximize satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict among them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, only what Levi terms "admissible." This book explores the consequences of denying the assumption and develops a general approach to decision-making under unresolved conflict. Professor Levi argues not only against the "strict Bayesian" position, but also against all the recent attempts to develop alternative models to Bayesianism. The book, which continues from his earlier The Enterprise of Knowledge, is certain to make an original and controversial contribution to the debates over choice theory. |
Contents
MORAL STRUGGLE | 1 |
12 Withholding judgement | 5 |
13 For the best all things considered | 13 |
14 The plan of this book | 17 |
DILEMMAS | 20 |
22 Guilt | 24 |
23 Choosing without resolving conflict | 28 |
24 Unresolved conflict generalized | 35 |
75 Credal indeterminacy | 114 |
76 Upper and lower betting quotients | 122 |
77 Ellsbergs problem | 128 |
78 The Allais problem | 140 |
79 Consistency of choice | 145 |
710 Conclusion | 148 |
CONFLICT AND SOCIAL AGENCY | 149 |
82 Benevolence and conflict | 154 |
VALUES IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY | 36 |
32 Cognitive and practical values | 42 |
33 Pluralism and conflict | 46 |
CHOICE AND FOREKNOWLEDGE | 47 |
42 Choice | 53 |
43 Foreknowledge and freedom | 58 |
44 The argument thus far | 67 |
VALUE STRUCTURES | 69 |
52 Ways of evaluation | 71 |
53 The mixture property | 74 |
54 Potential resolutions | 77 |
55 Cardinal and ordinal conflict | 79 |
56 Vadmissibility | 80 |
VALUES REVEALED BY CHOICES | 83 |
62 Value preference | 84 |
63 Robust preference | 85 |
64 Optimality | 86 |
65 Categorical Preference | 91 |
66 Revealing preference | 95 |
67 Normality | 97 |
68 Revealed preference according to Vadmissibility | 99 |
69 Lexicographical Vadmissibility | 104 |
610 Conclusion | 106 |
UNCERTAINTY AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT | 108 |
72 Extended value structures | 109 |
73 Lexicography | 110 |
74 Expected value | 111 |
DISTRIBUTING BENEFITS | 158 |
92 Benefit comparison structures | 164 |
93 The average benefit principle | 170 |
94 Benefit level dictatorship | 173 |
95 Admissibility | 174 |
96 Fair distribution | 177 |
UTILITARIANISM AND CONFLICT | 185 |
103 Average versus total utility | 186 |
104 Classical utilitarianism | 190 |
105 Preference utilitarianism | 192 |
106 Conclusion | 198 |
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY | 201 |
112 Lexicography | 204 |
113 Independence | 206 |
114 Paretian conditions | 208 |
115 Invariance | 210 |
116 Anonymity | 211 |
117 Benevolence for all | 212 |
118 Potential resolutions | 213 |
1110 Leximinbadmissibility and ablileximinadmissibility | 214 |
1111 Arrows impossibility | 216 |
CONFLICT AND INQUIRY | 219 |
Notes | 223 |
Bibliography | 243 |
| 247 | |
| 249 | |
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Common terms and phrases
ABL(I)-admissibility abl(i)leximin-admissibility admissible options agent's value apply Arrow assumption average benefit principle benefit comparison functions benefit comparison structure cardinal characterization choice function choose cognitive concern structure condition conflicts in value constraints context credal probability criteria criterion decision problem decision theory determine distribution elements Ellsberg endorse expected value extended value structure favor finite Fraassen free of ordinal given Hence hire Jane hiring Dolly hypotheses inconsistency inquiry insist invoke Jones land heads lexicographical lexicographically ordered leximin leximinb-admissibility Lilly Marcus marked by benevolence maximally ments minimax mixture moral struggle ordinal conflict positive affine transformations possible potential resolutions preference utilitarian quasi ordering rational agents rational choice relative requirement resolve revealed preference satisfied SBFL SBFL's security levels sense set of feasible social choice theory strict Bayesian sure-thing principle SWFL SWFL's tions toss ture unresolved conflict utility V-admissible v-functions value commitments marked value conflict value struc van Fraassen violated weak ordering weakly preferred welfare