GAME THEORY

Front Cover
Harvard University Press, Sep 15, 1997 - Business & Economics - 568 pages
5 Reviews
Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.
  

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LibraryThing Review

User Review  - PaolaM - LibraryThing

This is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Read full review

Review: Game Theory. Analysis of conflict

User Review  - Alec - Goodreads

Dope notation Read full review

Contents

DecisionTheoretic Foundations
1
Basic Models
37
Equilibria of StrategicForm Games
88
Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games
154
Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form
213
Games with Communication
244
Repeated Games
308
Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games
370
Coalitions in Cooperative Games
417
Cooperation under Uncertainty
483
Bibliography
539
Index
553
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About the author (1997)

Roger B. Myerson is Harold L. Stuart Professor of Decision Sciences at the J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

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