Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment

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Oxford University Press, Nov 4, 2004 - Philosophy - 238 pages
Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work, which proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such 'sentimental rules' enjoy an advantage in cultural evolution, which partly explains the success of certain moral norms. This has sweeping and exciting implications for philosophical ethics. Nichols builds on an explosion of recent intriguing experimental work in psychology on our capacity for moral judgment and shows how this empirical work has broad import for enduring philosophical problems. The result is an account that illuminates fundamental questions about the character of moral emotions and the role of sentiment and reason in how we make our moral judgments. This work should appeal widely across philosophy and the other disciplines that comprise cognitive science.
 

Contents

Toward a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment
3
The Varied Emotional Responses to Suffering in Others
30
3 Is It Irrational to Be Amoral? How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism
65
4 Philosophical Sentimentalism
83
5 Sentiment Reason and Motivation
97
6 A Fragment of the Genealogy of Norms
118
7 Moral Evolution
141
8 Commonsense Objectivism and the Persistence of Moral Judgment
166
References
199
Index
219
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