Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

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Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman
Cambridge University Press, Jul 8, 2002 - Psychology - 857 pages
9 Reviews
Is our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This 2002 book examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982 (by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky).
  

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Review: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

User Review  - Steven Peterson - Goodreads

In 1982, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky edited a volume, "Judgment under Uncertainty." This served as a culmination of their and others' research, bringing together in one volume a large number of ... Read full review

Review: Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

User Review  - Alex MacMillan - Goodreads

No, I did not read this cover to cover. This was a birthday gift from my Mom, who declared it her favorite Booth School textbook. Every Winter or Summer break between semesters at UW-Madison I would ... Read full review

Contents

Then and Now
1
A Representativeness and Availability
19
Attribute Substitution
49
A Disjunction
82
Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived
98
B Anchoring Contamination and Compatibility
120
Adjustment Heuristic
139
Why Language
150
The Affect Heuristic
397
Implications
421
B Support Theory
441
Advances
474
Recent Advances
489
Alternative Perspectives on Heuristics
510
Moods Influence Judgments
534
Automated Choice Heuristics
548

Inferential Correction
167
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem
185
The Contagion
201
Compatibility Effects in Judgment and Choice
217
Forecasting Confidence and Calibration
230
The Causes and Consequences
250
Probability Judgment across Cultures
271
Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting
292
Optimism
313
The Role
324
The Dilemma
334
E Norms and Counterfactuals
348
A Two Systems of Reasoning
379
A Everyday Judgment and Behavior
601
The Role of Representativeness
617
Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction
625
Social
636
B Expert Judgment
666
Do Analysts Overreact?
678
Heuristics
686
Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
716
Heuristics and Biases in Application
730
TheoryDriven Reasoning about Plausible Pasts
749
References
763
Index
855
Copyright

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About the author (2002)

Thomas Gilovich is a professor of psychology at Cornell University and author of "How We Know What Isn't So". He lives in Ithaca, New York.

Daniel Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his pioneering work with Amos Tversky on decision-making.

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