Evidence and Religious BeliefKelly James Clark, Raymond J. VanArragon A fundamental question in philosophy of religion is whether religious belief must be based on evidence in order to be properly held. In recent years two prominent positions on this issue have been staked out: evidentialism, which claims that proper religious belief requires evidence; and Reformed epistemology, which claims that it does not. Evidence and Religious Belief contains eleven chapters by prominent philosophers which push the discussion in new directions. Thevolume has three parts. The first part explores the demand for evidence: some chapters object to it while others seek to restate it or find space for compromise between Reformed epistemology and evidentialism. The second part explores ways in which beliefs are related to evidence; that is, ways in which theevidence for or against religious belief that is available to a person can depend on that person's background beliefs and other circumstances. The third part contains chapters that discuss actual evidence for and against religious belief. Evidence for belief in God includes the so-called common consent of the human race and the way that such belief makes sense of the moral life; evidence against it includes profound puzzles about divine freedom which suggest that it is impossible for a beingto be morally perfect. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Exploring the Demand for Evidence | 11 |
The Relation of Beliefs to Evidence | 75 |
Evidence and Religious Belief | 133 |
| 203 | |
| 211 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept acquire adequate answer argue argument atheistic basic better Christian claim cognitive common concept concerning conclusion condition conscientious consider course create defeater depend desire divine doubt epistemic evidence evidentialism evil evolutionary example experience explanation fact faculties fails faith function give given God exists God’s God’s existence grounds happiness Hick Hiddenness hold human important individuals inference interests justified kind knowledge lack least loves matters Mavrodes moral Moser motivation natural objection obligations one’s Oxford perfect perhaps person phenomenal conservatism philosophical Plantinga plausible possible premise principle probability problem produced proper properties proposition question rational reality reason reflection relevant reliable Religion religious belief require respect response seems sense significant simply sort suggestion Suppose theistic theory things treat true trust truth understanding University Press virtue warranted