CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis |
Common terms and phrases
17 October 25 October August bases blockade buildup in Cuba Bundy Carter CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY construction coverage Cuban DATE Defense Intelligence Agency DEFERRED ROUTINE deployed deployment Director of Central discussion Eisenhower equipment estimate Evaluation of Soviet flight GROUP 1 Excluded Guanajay Guided Missile Havana identified indicated INFO installations IRBM ISSUING OFFICE Joint Evaluation Khrushchev Lansdale Latin American launch launchers Lundahl McCone Director McGeorge Bundy McNamara meeting military action missile sites missiles in Cuba MONGOOSE MRBM sites National Intelligence Estimate nuclear warheads October 1962 Excerpt October 1962 Mission offensive missile offensive weapons OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Operation MONGOOSE overflights photography President probably reconnaissance RELEASING OFFICER Reverse Blank ROUTING Rusk Sagua Sagua La Grande San Cristobal Secretary September 1962 Soviet military Soviet Missile Threat Soviet ships Soviet Union Special Group surface-to-air missile targets Threat in Cuba TOP SECRET PSALM trailers United USIB USSR White House
Popular passages
Page 139 - Disclosure of classified information (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States...
Page 211 - SNIE 11-19-62: MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION ON CUBA...
Page 292 - Z got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.
Page 89 - Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.
Page 154 - In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.
Page 296 - USSR/Cuba." 24 October 1962 {Excerpt) TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA 24 October 1962 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL SUMMARY CONTENTS October 1962 1. We do not believe the measures to achieve a higher degree of action readiness for Soviet and bloc forces are being taken- on a crash basis.
Page 197 - A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere.
Page 92 - Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.
Page 93 - The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there.
Page 153 - General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation Mongoose. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of...