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Law and Market Organization The Historical
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agency costs agents analysis applicant approach assume asymmetric information behavior Cambridge capital cartels Coase common property competition constraints consumers contract courts crime rate Cuanajo culture daimyo Dictator Game discussion distribution economists effect efficiency empirical employer equilibrium example exist factor firms function fur die gesamte game theory gesamte Staatswissenschaft Group hostility externality incentive increase individual Industrial information asymmetries innovation Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics interaction Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional labor land liability moral hazard Nash equilibrium nomic norms optimal organization output paper Pareto optimal payoff political pollution problem production profit property rights rationality region regulation result retail risk role Roman rules sector social squatters standard strategy structure Superfund Theoretical Economics theory tion trade Transaction Cost Economics transaction costs Tucuma Ultimatum Game wage Williamson Zeitschrift fur